Is \u27Pay-to-Play\u27 Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study by Webber, David
Boston University School of Law
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2010
Is 'Pay-to-Play' Driving Public Pension Fund
Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical
Study
David Webber
Boston Univeristy School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Webber, Is 'Pay-to-Play' Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 Boston University
Law Review 2031 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/497
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organization 
Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in 
Securities Class Actions? 
An Empirical Study 
David H. Webber 
March 2010 
LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
WORKING PAPER NO. 09-28 
2031
IS “PAY-TO-PLAY” DRIVING PUBLIC PENSION FUND 
ACTIVISM IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS?  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
DAVID H. WEBBER*
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 2032 
 I. THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION OF THE PSLRA AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS AS FREQUENT LEAD
PLAINTIFFS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS ...................................... 2036 
A. The Lead Plaintiff Provision of the PSLRA ............................... 2036 
B. The Emergence of Public Pension Funds as Players in 
Securities Class Actions ............................................................ 2039 
C. The “Pay-to-Play” Theory of Public Pension Funds 
Securities Litigation Activism .................................................... 2043 
 II. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 2046 
 III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA ........................................ 2049 
A. Who Controls the Largest Public Pension Funds? .................... 2049 
B. Lead Plaintiff Appointments of the Largest Public Pension 
Funds ......................................................................................... 2051 
C. Who Controls the Litigating Funds? ......................................... 2056 
D. Lead Plaintiff Appointments of the Litigating Funds ................ 2058 
E. The Never-Appointed Funds ...................................................... 2062 
F. Financial Experts on Pension Fund Boards .............................. 2064 
G. Social Investment Criteria and Litigation Activism ................... 2065 
 IV. WHY DO BENEFICIARY BOARD MEMBERS SEEK LEAD PLAINTIFF 
APPOINTMENTS? ................................................................................ 2069 
A. Hypothesis Testing for Beneficiary Board Member Pursuit 
of Lead Plaintiff Appointments .................................................. 2072 
1. Beneficiary Litigation Activism and Unions ....................... 2072 
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University Law School.  I would like to thank 
Marcel Kahan for his thoughtful comments on this Article and for his mentorship.  I would 
also like to thank Ashwini Agrawal, William Allen, Jennifer Arlen, Miriam Baer, Alan 
Gotthelf, Joseph Grundfest, Yair Listokin, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Seth Poloner, Mark 
Ramseyer, Roberta Romano, Gary Simon, Irit Tau-Webber, Randall Thomas, Monika 
Trapp, Natalya Vinokourova, David Walker, Tracy Yue Wang, Mayris Webber, Elliot 
Weiss, and participants in the 20th Annual American Law & Economics Association 
Conference and the Corporate Law Policy Analysis Seminar at NYU Law School for their 
helpful comments.  I am grateful to the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business for 
financial support during the composition of this article.  Thanks also to Daniel Evans and 
Isaac MacDonald for excellent research assistance. 
2032 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90: 2031 
2. Beneficiary Pursuit of Lead Plaintiff Appointments 
and Pension Fund Underfunding ......................................... 2072 
 V. THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICIANS ON PENSION FUND LITIGATION 
ACTIVISM .......................................................................................... 2074 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 2080 
The recent emergence of public pension funds as frequent lead plaintiffs in 
securities class actions has prompted speculation that the funds’ litigation 
activism is driven by “pay-to-play.”  Pay-to-play alleges that politicians drive 
the high rate of public pension fund lead plaintiff appointments; the politicians 
purportedly direct the funds to pursue securities class actions in return for 
campaign contributions made to them by plaintiffs’ lawyers.  This Article 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the securities litigation activity of 111 
such funds from the years 2003 through 2006.  Three of the Article’s findings 
cast doubt on the pay-to-play theory, including that: (1) politicians and 
political control negatively correlate with lead plaintiff appointments; (2) 
beneficiary board members – and outright beneficiary control of the board – 
positively correlate with such appointments; and (3) the degree of a pension 
fund’s underfunding positively correlates with lead plaintiff appointments, 
particularly when the fund is controlled by beneficiaries.  This evidence 
suggests that beneficiary board members (not politicians) drive these cases for 
reasons having to do with the financial soundness of the fund.  The Article 
analyzes the substantial role played by these members in securities class 
actions in light of prior research comparing such board members to corporate 
managers with an equity stake in a corporation.  The Article also finds no 
support for the theory that unions drive beneficiary board members to obtain 
lead plaintiff appointments, and offers evidence that resistance by politicians 
to lead plaintiff appointments correlates with the degree of business influence 
in the politicians’ home states.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past year, the prospect of pay-to-play in securities class actions has 
generated worrying headlines and scolding editorials.  The Wall Street Journal
alone has run a front-page article and two lead op-eds on the subject since 
November 2009.1  This alarmist press has complemented a furious lobbying 
effort in Washington; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has pressed for 
securities litigation reform, and against the recently established consumer 
1 See, e.g., Pay-to-Play Torts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009, at A18 (calling for 
investigation of purported pay-to-play between plaintiffs’ law firms and public pension 
funds); Mark Maremont et al., Trial Lawyers Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010, at A1 (describing campaign contributions made by plaintiffs’ law firms, 
including contributions to politicians on public pension fund boards who pursued securities 
class actions with contributing law firms); Progress on Pay to Play, WALL ST. J., Feb, 12, 
2010, at A22 (praising reforms designed to reduce purported pay-to-play).  
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finance protection agency2 – citing pay-to-play concerns.  The substantial role 
public pension funds play as lead plaintiffs in these cases lies at the core of this 
frenzy.  In recent years, such funds, or their sister union funds, have obtained 
as much as forty percent of lead-plaintiff appointments in securities class 
actions.3  The pay-to-play theory suggests that politicians who serve on these 
public pension fund boards, or appoint members to these boards, collect 
campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers.4  In turn, the politicians cause 
the funds to obtain lead-plaintiff appointments and to appoint the contributing 
lawyers to lucrative lead-counsel positions.5  This accusation – promoted by 
defense lobbies such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and others, but not by 
shareholder advocacy groups – has cast a pall of corruption over what was 
previously viewed as the welcome participation of public pension funds in 
these cases.  Prior research has demonstrated that public pension funds have 
performed admirably in the leadership role: they have increased recoveries for 
the class, procured corporate governance reforms, improved board 
independence, and reduced attorneys’ fees.6  This Article empirically tests the 
pay-to-play claims made about the funds.  It concludes that such claims have 
been overstated; in fact, public pension fund participation in securities class 
actions is driven by beneficiary board members (board members who are 
themselves fund beneficiaries and who peer beneficiaries elect to the board) – 
not politicians.  These beneficiary board members are motivated to bring suit, 
2 UNITED STATES CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION REFORM 11-12 (2007), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com 
/issues/docload.cfm?docId=1071 (calling for reform of pay-to-play in securities class 
actions); Press Release, Institute for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform 
Calls for Transparency in State AG Enforcement Provisions Contained in Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency Proposal (Sept. 22, 2009) (statement of Lisa A. Rickard, 
President of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform), available at
http://www.litigationfairness.org/component/ilr_media/30/pressrelease/2009/472.html 
(citing pay-to-play as a reason to oppose passage of the Consumer Financial Protection Act).   
3 GRACE LAMONT & PATRICIA ETZOLD, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007
SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 33 (2008), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/2007 
%20SECURITY%20LIT%20STUDY%20W-LT.PDF. 
4 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 147-49 (D.N.J. 1998), rev’d on other 
grounds, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating competing class counsel’s argument that at 
least one of the institutional lead plaintiffs selected by the court had received campaign 
contributions from its chosen lead counsel, “creat[ing] an appearance of impropriety 
because the contributions may have played a role in the selection of the [institution’s] lead 
counsel – a practice known as ‘pay-to-play’”). 
5 Id.  The pay-to-play theory has also been applied to other aspects of securities class 
actions, such as the lead plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel, or the payment of attorneys’ 
fees.  This Article focuses exclusively on the form of pay-to-play which suggests that 
campaign contributions are what drive public pension funds to obtain lead plaintiff 
appointments in the first place, which has been widely alleged and is the most prominent of 
the various pay-to-play theories.     
6 See infra Part I.B. 
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at least in part, by concerns about the fraud’s impact on their own financially 
vulnerable retirement savings, and those of their peer beneficiaries.  “Pay-to-
play,” to the extent it occurs, plays at most a minor role in motivating public 
pension fund lead plaintiff appointments. 
Public pension funds are usually defined-benefit funds that invest the 
retirement savings of public employees, such as teachers, police and fire 
department employees, sanitation workers, clerical workers, and judges.  
Participation by these funds as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions marks 
at least a partial fulfillment of one of the primary purposes of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA” or the “Act”), which 
was to empower institutional investors to obtain lead-plaintiff appointments in 
securities class actions.7  Congress believed that institutional investors, 
sophisticated investors with significant losses at stake, would carefully select 
and monitor plaintiffs’ lawyers to the benefit of the class of aggrieved 
shareholders, in contrast to individual lead plaintiffs with meager 
shareholdings and little leverage over their counsel.8  To accomplish this, 
Congress created rules favoring the selection of institutional investors as lead 
plaintiffs and enabled these lead plaintiffs to select counsel for the class.9
This is the first Article addressing the pay-to-play question that employs a 
methodology to account for all types of public pension funds that participate in 
securities class actions, including both state and local public pension funds and 
pension funds controlled by politicians versus those controlled by 
beneficiaries.10  It also uses the largest sample of public pension funds among 
7 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10-11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689-92 
(“The Committee believes that the lead plaintiff – not lawyers – should drive the litigation. . 
. .  The Committee intends to increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as 
lead plaintiffs by requiring the court to presume that the member of the purported class with 
the largest financial stake in the relief sought is the ‘most adequate plaintiff.’ . . .  [T]he 
Committee permits the lead plaintiff to choose the class counsel.  This provision is intended 
to permit the plaintiff to choose counsel rather than have counsel choose the plaintiff.”). 
8 In adopting the PSLRA, Congress noted that “[i]nstitutions with large stakes in class 
actions have much the same interests as the plaintiff class generally; thus, courts could be 
more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision of institutional plaintiffs were 
‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.”  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9 n.34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 
(quoting Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 
2053, 2060-61 (1995)).   
9 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (“[In general,] the court shall adopt a 
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter 
is the person or group of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has the largest 
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.”). 
10 Cf. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions (Univ. 
of Mich. Law & Econ. Empirical. Legal Studies Ctr. Paper No. 09-025, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527047.  Focusing on attorneys’ fees, this paper argues that 
above-median asset size state public pension funds lower attorneys’ fees regardless of 
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Articles that have examined this issue, and is also the first to examine pension 
funds that do not participate in these cases.  The methodology employed here 
addresses the fact that campaign contribution data is effectively unavailable for 
almost all local public pension funds (and some state funds); local funds 
compose nearly two-thirds of all public pension fund lead plaintiffs and thus 
any methodology that excludes the local funds fails to account for the majority 
of public pension fund activity in securities class actions.  What is universally 
available is the board structure of public pension funds.  In particular, this 
Article focuses on the role of politicians and fund beneficiaries as board 
members, finding that the percentage of board seats controlled by politicians – 
and outright control of the board by a politician or politicians – correlates 
negatively with lead plaintiff appointments, whereas the percentage of board 
seats controlled by beneficiaries – or outright beneficiary control of the board – 
correlates positively with such appointments.  This Article also finds that the 
degree of the funds’ underfunding correlates positively with lead plaintiff 
appointments, particularly when the funds are controlled by beneficiaries.   
These results suggest that pay-to-play is a less significant driver of public 
pension fund participation than is widely believed, and is less important than 
forces related to beneficiary influence over public pension funds.  If pay-to-
play were driving lead plaintiff appointments, one would expect politicians and 
political control to correlate positively with lead plaintiff appointments; 
plaintiffs’ lawyers would not pay politicians who could not deliver the “play.”  
Instead, as is discussed at length below, a fund’s litigation activism is linked to 
the degree of its underfunding and is driven by beneficiaries, who have been 
identified by previous researchers as superior managers of public pension 
funds.11  Beneficiary board members of underfunded public pension funds may 
whether the funds received campaign contributions, although the paper concludes that this 
advantage disappears when the funds have received a “high contribution.”  Id. at 35-36.  The 
small number of funds falling into this latter category is consistent with the claims in this 
paper that, at most, pay-to-play is a marginal phenomenon in securities class actions.  The 
Choi et al. paper makes no assessment of pay-to-play among local funds.  See also Drew T. 
Johnson-Skinner, Note, Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions: A Look at Lawyers’ 
Campaign Contributions, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1725, 1728 (2009) (finding that some law 
firms contribute to the investment funds that select them as class counsel).  
11 Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 826-27 (1993) (reporting that beneficiary board 
members who are elected by beneficiaries correlate with superior financial performance, but 
that beneficiary board members who are appointed by elected officials – like the officials 
themselves and their other appointees – correlate negatively with financial performance, 
although the correlation is not statistically significant); David Hess, Protecting and 
Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance 
Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 216-17 (2005) (“[Member-elected 
trustees] are motivated, accountable to plan beneficiaries, and independent of political 
influence. . . .  Member-elected trustees’ dedication to their duties also appears to be 
beneficial to plan financial performance.”). 
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be particularly interested in bringing securities fraud class actions not only 
because they (and their families and co-workers) personally suffer losses in 
securities frauds – losses that may be more acutely painful for funds that are 
already under-resourced – but because these beneficiary board members are 
directly accountable to their funds’ beneficiaries and can be voted off the 
board.  They therefore have a greater incentive both to take action to remedy 
losses, and to be viewed as zealously guarding and advancing their fund’s 
bottom line.   
This Article also suggests an obvious, if previously overlooked, point: that 
politicians are as susceptible to campaign contributions and political pressure 
from business interests as they are from plaintiffs’ lawyers, and that such 
activity, instead of increasing public pension fund litigiousness, may be 
decreasing it.  I define politicians’ responsiveness to business interests, 
whether because of campaign contributions from such interests or 
responsiveness to pro-business constituents generally, as “pay-not-to-play.”  
Finally, this Article examines the impact of other structural features on the 
funds’ litigiousness, including whether the presence of financial experts on the 
board or social investment criteria impact lead plaintiff appointments.   
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the lead plaintiff and lead-
counsel provisions of the PSLRA, which established the presumption favoring 
large institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions.  Part I 
also discusses the subsequent emergence of public pension funds as significant 
players in such class actions, and some of the theories that have described this 
emergence, including “pay-to-play.”  Part II sets forth the methodology 
employed in gathering and analyzing the data on public pension fund lead 
plaintiff appointments from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2006 for two 
samples of funds: the largest funds by asset size (the “Largest Funds”) and the 
funds that obtained at least one lead plaintiff appointment (the “Litigating 
Funds”).  Part III presents and analyzes the data from the two samples.  Part IV 
examines the prominent role beneficiary board members played in securities 
class actions, including the connections among such board members, lead 
plaintiff appointments, and the degree of the fund’s underfunding.  Part V 
analyzes the negative correlation between politicians and lead plaintiff 
appointments and discusses the possibility that business interests are 
successfully reducing litigation activism by politically controlled pension 
funds.   
I. THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION OF THE PSLRA AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS AS FREQUENT LEAD PLAINTIFFS IN SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS
A. The Lead Plaintiff Provision of the PSLRA 
Congress enacted the PSLRA to address the pervasive belief that securities 
class actions failed to aid investors and enriched plaintiffs’ lawyers who filed 
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frivolous strike suits that cost defendants more to defend than to settle.12
Adopted over President Clinton’s veto, though with substantial Democratic 
support,13 the PSLRA fulfilled a political commitment to securities litigation 
reform enshrined in the Contract with America, a document the Republican 
Party released six weeks before the November 1994 mid-term election that all 
but two of the party’s House candidates signed.14  Among other things, the 
PSLRA sought to shift control of securities class actions from plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to institutional investors.15  Inspired by an argument Elliott Weiss and 
John Beckerman originated in their article, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: 
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class 
Actions,16 Congress concluded that “institutions with large stakes in class 
actions have much the same interests as the plaintiff class generally; thus, 
courts could be more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision of 
institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with 
settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.”17  Prior to 
passage of the PSLRA, courts would usually appoint whichever plaintiff filed 
the first lawsuit as the lead plaintiff.18  This “race to the courthouse” led to 
perceived abuses, whereby plaintiffs’ lawyers relied on “professional 
plaintiffs” or law-firm employees who owned at least one share, sometimes 
fractions of shares, in a broad array of companies; this permitted law firms to 
12 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688 (“Most 
defendants in securities class action lawsuits choose to settle rather than face the enormous 
expense of discovery and trial.”)  To what extent plaintiffs’ lawyers filed frivolous cases in 
the pre-PSLRA (and post-PSLRA) periods has been the subject of much scholarly debate.  
See generally Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1465 (2004) (surveying conflicting literature on whether passage of the PSLRA increased or 
decreased shareholder welfare). 
13 Neil A. Lewis, Securities Bill Becomes Law as the Senate Overrides Veto, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1995, at Section 1, 39 (noting that the House of Representatives overrode President 
Clinton’s veto 319 to 100, while the Senate overrode the veto 68 to 30).  
14 As part of the “Republican Contract with America,” incumbent Republican members 
of the House of Representatives, and non-incumbent Republican candidates for a seat in the 
House of Representatives, pledged to bring to the floor of the House ten bills within the first 
100 days of the 104th Congress, which met from January 3, 1995 to January 3, 1997.  
Republican Contract with America, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/ house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).  The 
ninth of these bills was entitled “The Common Sense Legal Reform Act,” which included 
provisions for the reform of securities class actions.  Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 
1995, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/ 
legalrefb.txt (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
15 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10-11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689-90. 
16 Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2060-61. 
17 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (quoting Weiss & 
Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2061). 
18 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. 
2038 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90: 2031 
file a quick lawsuit in the event of an alleged fraud.19  In some extreme 
instances, plaintiffs’ attorneys illegally bribed their lead plaintiffs.20  The pre-
PSLRA process also effectively gave the lead counsel total control over the 
class action.  By representing a lead plaintiff client with minimal stake in the 
outcome of the case, lead counsel operated without meaningful supervision.   
Two provisions of the PSLRA, the lead plaintiff and lead counsel 
provisions, transformed the lead plaintiff process from a “race to the 
courthouse” to an orderly procedure.  The PSLRA established a presumption 
that the lead plaintiff would be the class member with the largest claimed loss 
who sought the position.  The lead plaintiff provision states: “In general . . . the 
court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private 
action arising under this chapter is the person or group of persons that . . . in 
the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the relief 
sought by the class.”21  In turn, the lead-counsel provision states that “the most 
adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain 
counsel to represent the class.”22  In adopting these provisions, Congress 
endeavored “to increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as 
lead plaintiffs.”23  With more assets invested more widely in the market, 
institutional investors were more likely to be exposed to fraud, and more likely 
to suffer the largest loss. 
Despite the newfound powers they obtained under the PSLRA, institutional 
investors were slow to accept Congress’s invitation to participate in securities 
class actions.  Initially, the number of institutions seeking lead plaintiff 
appointments remained quite small.  In the first complete year after passage of 
the PSLRA, institutional investors attained lead plaintiff status in just 8 of 105 
filed cases; in the second year, they led 9 of 175 cases.24  An institutional 
19 Id. at 9, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 688; see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra
note 8, at 2061. 
20 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Given a 30-Month Prison Term for 
Hiding Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at C3 (reporting sentencing of plaintiffs’ 
lawyer Melvyn Weiss to thirty months’ imprisonment for paying kickbacks to clients who 
served as lead plaintiffs in his cases); Michael Parrish, Leading Class-Action Lawyer is 
Sentenced to Two Years in Kickback Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at C3 (reporting 
sentencing of plaintiffs’ attorney William Lerach to two years’ imprisonment for paying 
kickbacks to clients who served as lead plaintiffs in his cases). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006).   
22 § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
23 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. 
24 Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff 
Provision of the Private Litigations Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869,  
877 (2006) (citing OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE 
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, 51 (1997)); Elayne Demby, Ducking Lead 
Plaintiff Status, PLANSPONSOR (May 1999), http://www.assetpub.com/archive/ps/99-
05psmay/may99PS58 a.html. 
2010] PAY-TO-PLAY 2039 
investor served as lead plaintiff, either singly or as co-lead plaintiff with an 
individual, in only 46 of 259 post-PSLRA securities class actions filed from 
1996-2002.25  Institutional investor participation as lead plaintiffs, and, in 
particular, public pension fund participation, rose modestly from zero percent 
pre-PSLRA to over ten percent between 1996 and 2000.26  By contrast, the 
percentage of private institutional investors actually dropped slightly from 
0.5% to 0.3% in the post-PSLRA period.27  But more recently, public pension 
funds and union funds have begun to step forward in significant numbers to 
lead securities class actions.  In both 2006 and 2007, these funds served as lead 
plaintiff in 40% of securities class actions.28  The prolonged delay in 
institutional investor participation, followed by a spike in institutional 
participation attributable almost exclusively to public and union pension funds, 
has led some commentators to divide the post-PSLRA era into two periods: the 
“‘initial’ post-PSLRA period,” from 1995-1999, which predated public 
pension fund involvement, and the “‘mature’ post-PSLRA period,” from 2000 
to the present, in which public pension funds have assumed a dominant role in 
securities class actions.29
B. The Emergence of Public Pension Funds As Players in Securities Class 
Actions 
The emergence of public pension funds as active players in securities 
litigation has been treated as puzzling and controversial, in part because it is 
unclear why institutional investors of any kind would want the job.  Obtaining 
a lead plaintiff appointment confers virtually no specialized benefit on the 
appointed individual or entity.  Lead plaintiffs cannot be paid for their service 
to the class, except in very limited circumstances related to reimbursement of 
certain limited expenses.  They merely collect their pro rata share of the 
settlement.  Therefore, they have a strong incentive to free ride.  Because 
evidence has emerged that public pension funds are better lead plaintiffs, as 
discussed below, the ideal scenario from the point of view of a public pension 
class member is to have another public pension fund serve as lead plaintiff.  
That way, the class member fund benefits from the motivation and 
25 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis 
of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1622-23 (2006) 
[hereinafter Does the Plaintiff Matter?]. 
26 Choi et al., supra note 24, at 889 (reporting that public pension funds in their sample 
went from zero representation as lead plaintiffs in the pre-PSLRA period to over 10% in the 
post-PSLRA period.  In contrast, private institutions in the same sample dropped slightly 
from 0.5% representation as lead plaintiffs in the pre-PSLRA period to 0.3% in the post-
PSLRA period).  
27 Id.
28 LAMONT & ETZOLD, supra note 3, at 33. 
29 Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: 
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1519 (2006). 
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sophistication of an institutional lead plaintiff without itself having to bear the 
admittedly minimal burden of serving as lead plaintiff.   
Free-riding aside, in many instances, the losses institutional investors suffer 
in securities frauds may be large enough to qualify for a lead plaintiff 
appointment but are still trivial relative to the investors’ total assets.  For 
example, a recent study concluded that the average claimed loss for an 
institutional investor lead plaintiff in a securities class action is $3.9 million.30
Such a loss is inconsequential for the institutional investors with billions of 
dollars in assets that Congress envisioned as its ideal lead plaintiffs.  For this 
reason, at least one fund, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
(CalSTRS), has established a policy of seeking lead plaintiff appointments in 
cases where it suffered at least $5 million in losses (still just a fraction of its 
$103 billion in assets), while reserving the right to seek an appointment in the 
event of an “exceptional opportunity to preserve or enhance the long-term 
value of a significant portfolio holding or to deter wrongful corporate 
conduct.”31 In addition to small relative losses, some skeptics have concluded 
that absolute recoveries in successful class actions are typically very slight.  
NERA Economic Consulting has calculated that in 2002, 2003, and 2004, the 
ratio of settlements to investor losses was a shocking 2.7%, 2.9%, and 2.3%, 
respectively.32  Another source has placed average recoveries at 12.7% of 
investor losses,33 and CalSTRS itself has placed the figure as high as 14%.34
30 Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions, 44 (NYU Law 
and Econ. Res. Paper No. 08-53, June 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1293926 [hereinafter Motions for Lead Plaintiff]. 
31 See Teachers’ Retirement Board Policy Manual, CALSTRS (Sep. 2010), http://calstrs 
.com/About%20CalSTRS/Teachers%20Retirement%20Board/BoardPolicyManual.pdf#page
=153.  The manual states:  
In most cases, CalSTRS’ interests in securities class action litigation claims will be 
adequately addressed solely through passive participation as a class member.  
However, in select cases a higher level of involvement will be appropriate, including:  
Moving for Lead Plaintiff Status: In securities class action cases where CalSTRS’ 
potential damages exceed $5 million, or in other cases where there is an exceptional 
opportunity to preserve or enhance the long-term value of a significant portfolio 
holding or to deter wrongful corporate conduct, CalSTRS will consider moving for 
lead plaintiff status. 
Id.
32 John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (2006) (citing Elaine Buckberg et 
al., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Are WorldCom and Enron the 
New Standard?, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 6 (2005), http://www.nera.com/extImage/ 
Recent_Trends_07.2005.pdf).  NERA calculates that the ratio of settlements to investor 
losses has dropped from 7.1% in 1996, the year immediately following passage of the 
PSLRA.  See Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, 2008 Trends in Securities Class 
Actions, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 14 (December 2008), http://www.nera.com/ 
extImage/ PUB_Recent_Trends_Report_1208.pdf. 
33 Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 25, at 1621 n.132.   
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Such small recoveries on relatively small losses undoubtedly contributed to at 
least some institutional investors’ lack of enthusiasm for participating in 
securities class actions.  A surprisingly large number of institutions have been 
so indifferent to these cases that they failed even to file claims for funds to 
which they were entitled from settled securities class actions, at least until two 
articles by James Cox and Randall Thomas exposed this negligent practice as a 
breach of the funds’ fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries.35
Still, there are reasons for institutional investors to participate in securities 
class actions apart from compensation for losses.  For example, as repeat and 
long-term market players, institutional investors, including public pension 
funds, have an interest in the deterrence aspects of securities fraud class actions 
generally.  Perpetrators of the classic securities fraud cause a corporation to 
violate the securities laws and receive gains equal to only a small percentage of 
investor losses.36  They may be deterred easily from committing fraud by being 
forced to compensate investors for only a small share of the investors’ losses, 
as long as that compensation exceeds what the perpetrators would have gained 
from the fraud.37  Thus, even small recoveries by institutional investors in 
individual cases can have a deterrent effect across the markets broadly.  These 
recoveries may be at least partially covered by directors and officers insurance, 
which undermines their deterrent effect, but, in response, some public pension 
funds have begun insisting that individual defendants make payments out of 
34 See Draft of Securities Litigation Policy, CALSTRS 4 (Jan. 5, 2000), http:// 
www.calstrs.com/about%20calstrs/Teachers%20Retirement%20Board/AGENDAS/bod0100
pdf/cg0104.PDF. 
35 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to 
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005) 
(calculating that fewer than thirty percent of institutional investors with demonstrated losses 
filed claims against funds settling securities class actions); see also James D. Cox & Randall 
S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in 
Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 871 (2002) (citing a survey by National 
Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers showing that about one-third of 
the thirty-three respondent institutions had made no recovery of any asset losses in the prior 
five years, a time period in which more than 700 securities class action cases were settled).  
Weiss & Beckerman argued that institutional investors’ failure to pursue lead plaintiff 
appointments could be interpreted as a breach of their fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries.  
Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2125-26.   
36 Coffee, supra note 32, at 1547-48. 
37 Id.  Note that Coffee argues that the deterrent effects of securities class actions are 
increasingly inhibited by the fact that insurance companies – and not the perpetrators of the 
fraud themselves – frequently compensate investors for alleged frauds.  Id. Moreover, 
Jennifer Arlen and Bill Carney have argued that, for purposes of deterrence, a rule of agent 
liability supplemented by criminal enforcement is better than the current system of 
enterprise liability for securities class actions.  See generally Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. 
Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U.
ILL. L. REV. 691 (1992). 
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their own pockets as a condition of settlement.  Also, notwithstanding the 
prevalence of small recoveries, public pension funds still have an interest in 
maximizing recoveries for themselves, and by extension, for the class.  Recent 
studies support the conclusion that securities class actions led by public 
pension funds correlate with higher recoveries, lower attorneys’ fees, fewer 
dismissals, and greater post-litigation board independence.38  For example, a 
recent paper concludes that public pension funds not only increase monetary 
recoveries, even when one controls for cherry-picking of the best cases but 
they also decrease the probability of dismissal and increase board 
independence at the defendant companies.39  In a recent survey of public 
pension funds, the funds themselves assert that the size of their losses is the 
most important reason for seeking a lead plaintiff appointment.40  And at least 
some funds believe that they are capable of obtaining higher recoveries when 
serving as lead plaintiff.  For example, CalSTRS’s own securities litigation 
policy states that while most securities class actions recover 14% of losses, it 
anticipates recoveries can increase to 25% of losses when CalSTRS serves as 
lead plaintiff.41  Additional evidence suggests that these funds reduce 
attorneys’ fees and increase attorney hours worked.  The weight of the 
evidence suggests that public pension funds are simply better lead plaintiffs, 
which benefits both the funds themselves as well as the rest of the class. 
It is also true that there is little reason for public pension funds to be 
deterred by the costs of serving as lead plaintiff.  The vast majority of 
38 C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 
J. FIN. ECON. 356, 356-62 (2010)  (using a database from 1996 to 2005 and controlling for 
case determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff, finding that institutional investors, 
including public pension funds, decrease the probability of a case being dismissed, increase 
monetary recoveries, and improve the independence of boards at defendant companies); 
Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 25, at 1636-39 (finding that institutional investors 
increase settlements by 0.04% for every 1% increase in provable losses); Michael Perino, 
Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Funds 
Participation in Securities Class Actions, 24, 30-31 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research, 
Working Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (“Cases 
with public pension fund lead plaintiffs settle for greater amounts, even when controlling for 
institutional self-selection of larger, more high profile cases. Cases with public pension 
leads are also positively correlated with at least one proxy for attorney effort, the number of 
docket entries in the case, suggesting that institutional monitoring may be effective in 
reducing attorney shirking.”).  Some scholars have suggested that institutional investors may 
be “cherry picking” the best cases.  Choi et al., supra note 24, at 870, 892 (reporting some 
statistical evidence consistent with the “cherry-picking” theory); Does the Plaintiff Matter?,
supra note 25, at 1636-39 (finding that higher settlements by institutional investors in 
securities class actions may reflect that institutions “take the better cases”).   
39 Cheng et al., supra note 38. 
40 Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 
339 (2008). 
41 See CalSTRS Subcommittee on Corporate Governance, supra note 34, at 1-2. 
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securities class actions are brought by lead counsel who assume the cost of the 
litigation and are compensated by contingency fees.  At most, lead plaintiffs 
incur costs when employee time allotted to managing the class action could 
otherwise be allotted to another function. Thus, the emergence of public 
pension funds as lead plaintiffs may be explained by the fact that institutions 
are superior lead plaintiffs who increase recoveries and benefit from 
deterrence, at little cost to themselves, and that such funds lack the disabling 
conflicts that keep other institutional investors on the sidelines of securities 
litigation.42  Weiss and Beckerman predicted that public pension funds would 
be likely candidates for lead plaintiff appointments under what became the 
PSLRA, emphasizing that such funds were disproportionately active in 
corporate governance reform efforts prior to the Act’s passage.43
Others have argued that the emergence of public pension funds as lead 
plaintiffs is attributable to the relatively high recoveries in high profile cases 
that brought considerable press coverage to the funds that participated in the 
suit.  Some scholars have traced the beginning of significant public pension 
fund activism in securities class actions to the success of In re Cendant 
Corporation Securities Litigation, in which CalPERS, the New York State 
Common Retirement Fund, and the New York City Pension Funds obtained a 
$3.2 billion recovery for aggrieved shareholders.  In 1999, this was a record 
recovery for investors, which purportedly recovered 40% of investor losses.44
Subsequent recoveries by public pension funds of $7.2 billion and $6.15 billion 
in the Enron and WorldCom shareholder lawsuits, respectively, in addition to 
the favorable publicity the funds obtained from such recoveries, may have only 
magnified the trend.  Blockbuster recoveries aside, the most persistent and 
controversial explanation for public pension fund litigation activism offers a 
more cynical perspective: “pay-to-play.”   
C. The “Pay-to-Play” Theory of Public Pension Funds Securities Litigation 
Activism 
pay-to-play allegations were first prominently aired in the context of public 
pension funds as lead plaintiffs in In re Cendant Corporation Securities 
42 For example, it has been argued that mutual funds shun securities litigation because a 
significant portion of their business comes from managing the retirement funds of Fortune 
500 company employees.  Suing such companies would jeopardize their business 
relationships with the companies.  See, e.g., Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 25, at 
1609 (observing that mutual funds avoid lead plaintiff appointments because of their 
commercial relationships with corporations and accounting firms).  Moreover, lead plaintiffs 
must frequently sue the underwriters and possibly the accountants, with whom they may 
have ongoing business relationships.  Id.
43 Weiss & Beckermann, supra note 8, at 2111. 
44 Demonstrating Significant Recoveries, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN 
LLP, http://www.blbglaw.com/our_record_results/significant_recoveries (last visited Aug. 
24, 2010). 
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Litigation. 45  In Cendant, competing class counsel argued that at least one of 
the institutional lead plaintiffs had received campaign contributions from its 
chosen lead counsel, “creat[ing] an appearance of impropriety because the 
contributions may have played a role in the selection of the [institution’s] lead 
counsel – a practice known as ‘pay-to-play.’”46  The Cendant court dismissed 
the allegation as “speculative” and not violative of any law.47  Since Cendant,
some scholars have questioned the pay-to-play theory.  James Cox and Randall 
Thomas have noted that the pay-to-play in which plaintiffs’ securities class 
action firms allegedly engaged, “appears to be just part of a larger tapestry of 
‘pay-to-play’ practices by law firms generally.”48  Stephen Choi and Jill Fisch 
have questioned the pay-to-play theory in light of some evidence suggesting 
that there is no correlation between public pension fund litigation activism and 
the involvement of public officials.49  The public pension funds themselves 
reported to Choi and Fisch that their primary reason for seeking appointment 
as lead plaintiff was the size of their claimed losses.50
pay-to-play allegations – in particular, the allegation that public pension 
funds bring securities class actions in exchange for campaign contributions – 
have recently re-emerged.  In part, allegations of pay-to-play in the securities 
class action context have been triggered by incidents of pay-to-play in the 
investment adviser context; these latter incidents have little to do with 
45 Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913, 966 n.277; see also Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 25, at 1610-15. 
46 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 147-49 (D.N.J. 1998), rev’d on other 
grounds, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). 
47 Id.
48 Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 25, at 1614.  While noting that the pay-to-play 
purportedly engaged in by securities class action firms is part of this general “tapestry” of 
pay-to-play practices generally, including campaign contributions by law firms employed by 
states to elected officials in those states, Cox and Thomas suggest three potential reforms 
that would eliminate the “odor of corruption” such allegations cause.  Cox and Thomas 
suggest barring lead plaintiff funds from selecting lead counsel who have made political 
contributions to a government official with influence over the fund, placing the lead counsel 
decision in the hands of nonpartisan board officials instead of elected officials (as some 
states have already done), or mandatory disclosure to federal courts of campaign 
contributions made by proposed lead counsel to any institutional investor seeking the lead 
plaintiff position.  The court could then weigh these contributions as part of its discretion 
over the appointment of lead counsel.  Id. at 1614-15.   
49 Choi & Fisch, supra note 40, at 346.  But see Randall Thomas, Public Pension Funds 
as Shareholder Activists: A Comment on Choi and Fisch, 61 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 3 
(2008) (questioning the weight to be given to the Choi & Fisch study because of survey 
methodology and low response rate). 
50 Choi & Fisch, supra note 40, at 339.  On a related note, a recent draft paper by Choi 
and others concludes that pay-to-play may lead to higher attorneys’ fees for certain 
politically-controlled public pension funds.  The Price of Pay to Play, supra note 10 at 14-
16. 
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campaign contributions51 and have led to calls for further reform in securities 
class actions.  For example, the Wall Street Journal prominently re-aired pay-
to-play allegations in a lead editorial, arguing that “plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . 
make campaign contributions to public officials with the goal of being selected 
by those same officials to represent the pension fund in securities litigation.”52
More recently, the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page article in which it 
identified a public pension fund that had served as lead plaintiff twelve times – 
which would make it an extreme outlier in this Article’s dataset – and had 
collected significant contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers.53  The article also 
identified out-of-state campaign contributions made by plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
assuming that such contributions could only have been made for pay-to-play 
purposes, even if the politician who received the contributions did not serve on 
a pension fund board.54  The perception that public pension fund participation 
in securities class actions is fundamentally driven by pay-to-play has spurred 
calls for comprehensive reform, such as a proposal to eliminate public pension 
fund participation by the Institute for Legal Reform, an affiliate of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce: 
Many government pension funds are controlled by elected officials.  
Frequently, it turns out that the law firm selected to represent a pension 
fund in class action litigation has been the source of campaign 
contributions to the public officials running the fund. Several years ago, 
to address a similar problem in the selection of underwriters for 
government bond offerings, the SEC adopted a rule prohibiting “pay to 
play” by banning such contributions.  Congress should enact a similar 
prohibition, barring a law firm from becoming lead counsel if any lawyer 
at the firm has contributed to the campaign of any public official who in 
any way oversees the fund (by serving on the fund’s board, selecting 
those who serve on the board, supervising those who serve on the fund’s 
board, etc.).55
The Chamber of Commerce’s call for reform has resulted in proposed 
legislation in Congress, specifically the Securities Litigation Attorney 
Accountability and Transparency Act, introduced in the House of 
51 Craig Karmin & Peter Lattman, ‘Pay to Play’ Probe Ensnares Another, WALL ST. J., 
May 12, 2009, at C1 (discussing a pay to play pension probe concerning whether  
“investment decisions regarding retirees’ money were guided by improper influence 
peddling”). 
52 Pay-to-Play Torts, supra note 1, at A18. 
53 Mark Maremont et al., Trial Lawyers Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 3, 2010, at A1. 
54 Id.
55 United States Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Securities Class Action Litigation 
Reform 1, 11-12 (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
issues/docload.cfm?docId=1071. 
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Representatives as H.R. 5491 by Representative Jeb Hensarling (R-Tx)56 and 
in the Senate by Senator John Cornyn (R-Tx) as S. 3033.  The bill requires 
disclosure of “all political contributions made to elected officials with 
authority or influence over the appointment of counsel in the case.”57
Similarly, Senator Bennett (R-UT) has called for a SEC probe of pay-to-play 
practices.58  Others have called for forbidding plaintiffs’ law firms from 
representing public pension funds when the firms have contributed money to a 
politician on the funds’ boards.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also used 
the pay-to-play issue to oppose other types of reform, such as the establishment 
of a consumer financial protection agency.59
II. METHODOLOGY
This Article tests a number of hypotheses related to public pension fund 
activism in securities litigation, specifically: (1) that the Largest Funds obtain 
the most lead plaintiff appointments; and (2) that, assuming the pay-to-play 
theory is true, politicians on public pension fund boards (and political 
majorities on such boards) will correlate positively with lead plaintiff 
appointments. 
I began by examining the board structure of the top fifty-three U.S. public 
pension funds by asset size (the “Largest Funds”) from a dataset compiled by 
Oxford University researchers in 2004 (the “Oxford database”), which in turn 
was based upon a ranking of public pension funds by asset size conducted by 
Pensions and Investments magazine.60  Following Congress’s reasoning in 
56 What Can Investors Expect in 2009?, RISKMETRICS GROUP (December 8, 2008 11:21 
AM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2008/12/what-can-investors-expect-in-2009-submitt 
ed-by-ted-allen-publications.html. 
57 News Release, Cornyn Introduces Bill To Strengthen Transparency & Accountability 
In Securities Class-Action Litigation, (May 19, 2008), available at http:// 
cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=02923533-802a-
23ad-4e94-a4a2109dfca5&ContentType_id=b94acc28-404a-4fc6-b143-a9e15bf92da4 
&Group_id=24eb5606-e2db-4d7f-bf6c-efc5df80b676&MonthDisplay=5&YearDisplay= 
2008. 
58 Lee Davidson, ‘Pay to Play’ Probe Sought, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), 
July 8, 2009. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705315425/Pay-to-play-probe-sought. 
html.   
59 Press Release, Institute for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform 
Calls for Transparency in State AG Enforcement Provisions Contained in Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency Proposal (September 22, 2009), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilr_media/30/pressrelease/2009/472.htm
l (citing pay-to-play as a reason to oppose passage of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Act). 
60 The dataset I used to determine the board structure of the Largest Funds by asset size 
was compiled by researchers at the School of Geography & the Environment at the 
University of Oxford as part of Pension Funds and Urban Revitalization, a joint project of 
the School of Geography, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, and the Pensions 
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adopting the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision, the Largest Funds have the 
greatest probability of (a) being victimized by an alleged fraud and (b) 
sustaining the largest loss of the alleged fraud’s victims, thus making these 
funds strong candidates for appointment as lead plaintiffs under the PSLRA 
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the movant with the largest 
claimed loss.61  The Oxford database reveals significant variation in the 
governance structure of the Largest Funds’ boards.  I identified several features 
of the funds’ board structures that could bear on a board’s decision to seek lead 
plaintiff status, including: (1) the number and percentage of politicians on the 
fund’s board; (2) the number and percentage of political appointments to the 
fund’s board; (3) the number of politicians on the board or with appointing 
power to it; (4) the number and percentage of financial experts on the fund’s 
board; (5) the number and percentage of fund beneficiaries on the board; and 
(6) whether the board considers social investment criteria in its investment 
decisions.62  I also examined the pension funds’ (7) asset size and (8) board 
and Capital Stewardship Project of the Harvard Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard 
Law School.  KENDRA STRAUSS ET AL., U.S. PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION FUNDS AND URBAN 
REVITALIZATION: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICY AND PROGRAMS (2004), available at
http://urban.ouce.ox.ac.uk/overview.pdf.  The purpose of the Strauss et al. paper was to 
analyze the largest U.S. public pension funds by asset size to determine which funds would 
be most interested in targeting investments in urban economic development projects.  As 
part of this analysis, Strauss et al. reviewed the structure of the pension fund boards.  I 
independently reviewed a sample of the Largest Funds board structures identified in this 
paper by visiting fund websites.  On the rare occasion that data was missing or incomplete, I 
gathered the relevant information from the websites of the respective public pension funds.  
The Oxford Database was based upon a ranking of the top 200 public pension funds by asset 
size printed in Pensions & Investments. See Top Pension Fund Profiles, Charts and Tables,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 26, 2004, at 16-19.  
61 Asset allocation varies somewhat between funds, with most funds investing between 
forty-five and fifty-five percent of their assets in domestic securities.  Therefore, some funds 
may have less exposure to fraud than other funds that are smaller by total assets.   
62 One possible argument against this methodology is that the board may be controlled 
by a politician regardless of its composition.  Under this view, “star struck” beneficiary 
board members simply defer to a politician on major fund decisions, even if the 
beneficiaries control the board.  Prior research demonstrating that beneficiaries correlate 
with higher fund returns than politicians contradicts this view.  See infra Part IV.  Still, if 
this view is correct, one would expect that the methodology employed here would not 
produce statistically significant results; if board composition does not matter because the 
politician is always in control, then it will not predict lead plaintiff appointments.  
Conversely, an ex ante argument in favor of this methodology is that board composition 
matters greatly because beneficiary and politician board members have different agendas for 
public pension funds, and therefore control of the board by one faction or the other matters 
for its management.  In addition to the contrasting incentives between politicians and 
beneficiaries discussed throughout this piece and the prior research just noted, this view is 
further buttressed by interviews the author conducted with pension fund board members and 
lawyers practicing in the field.  Such interviews reveal a view of the relationship between 
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size.63  Using a dataset of securities class actions (“SCAS Dataset”) provided 
to me by Securities Class Action Services, a division of Riskmetrics Group,64 I 
identified the number of lead plaintiff appointments obtained by each of the 
Largest Funds for the four-year period from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 
2006. 
Using the same SCAS dataset, I then assembled a separate database of all of 
the public pension funds that obtained at least one lead plaintiff appointment 
from 2003-2006, seventy-eight funds in sum (the “Litigating Funds”).65  I then 
hand-collected data on the structure of the funds using the same variables 
noted above, which I obtained almost exclusively from materials available on 
the funds’ websites.66  In a few instances where the information was not 
available on the internet, I gathered it either through telephone or email 
interviews.67  I then ran statistical tests on the Largest Funds and the Litigating 
Funds databases to determine if certain structural features correlate with a 
fund’s likelihood of obtaining lead plaintiff appointments.  I did not look at 
campaign contributions directly because such data is readily available and 
searchable at the state level, but not at the local level.  Two-thirds of the 
Litigating Funds are local funds, mostly domiciled in midsized cities or large 
counties.  There are numerous barriers to obtaining data on campaign 
contributions to mayors, city treasurers, or county executives, the types of 
politicians who are represented on most of the funds that participate in 
securities class actions.  
politicians and beneficiaries as an employer-employee relationship.  The politicians or 
employers sit on the board to oversee the state, county, or municipality’s contributions to the 
fund, in part because the politicians and employers may have to contribute more resources 
to the funds if they falter.  The beneficiaries, on the other hand, may resent the presence of 
the politician; the funds are part of the beneficiaries’ compensation and therefore an 
employer or politician should have no further say over their use.  The statistical significance 
of the results presented below suggests that the latter view of the relationship between 
politicians and beneficiaries is the more accurate of the two.     
63 Where these criteria were absent from the Oxford Database, I compiled them from the 
websites of the pension funds themselves.  See supra note 60.   
64 SCAS dataset (on file with author). 
65 I found eighty-one public pension funds that obtained at least one lead plaintiff 
appointment in the four-year period under study.  I excluded the Ontario Teachers’ Pension 
Plan Board because it is not based in the United States.  I could not find sufficient 
information for two other funds, leaving me with a sample size of seventy-eight.   
66 All of the information in this Article pertaining to the structure of the Filer Funds, 
including asset size and board structure, was gathered from the websites of the respective 
public pension funds, and from interviews conducted with public pension fund staff.  I 
gathered financial data from the years 2003-04, to match the data I gathered from the 
Oxford database. 
67 I could not obtain sufficient structural information for two funds, so I excluded them 
from the sample, reducing my sample size from eighty-one to seventy-eight funds, including 
my exclusion of the Ontario Public Pension Fund. 
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To empirically test the impact of business interests on public pension funds 
securities litigation activism, I regressed certain measures of business influence 
within a state against lead plaintiff appointments obtained by funds within the 
state.  I hypothesized that public pension funds from pro-business states would 
obtain fewer lead plaintiff appointments than public pension funds from states 
with less business influence.  I used the following measures of business 
influence within a state: (1) the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s state litigation 
ranking and (2) a state-by-state “business friendliness” ranking by Forbes 
Magazine.
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
A. Who Controls the Largest Public Pension Funds? 
In 2004, there were 2,659 public pension funds in the United States,68 with 
total assets of $1.93 trillion under management.69  The fifty-three Largest 
Funds held $1.8 trillion70 in assets, or 92% of the total, leaving just $160 
billion to be managed by the remaining 2,606 funds.  The largest fund, 
CalPERS, held $148.8 billion in assets,71 almost equal to the assets held by the 
2,606 small funds combined.  Therefore, over time, cohering with Congress’s 
reasoning, one would expect the Largest Funds to be more exposed to fraud 
and more likely to suffer the largest losses, qualifying them for the most lead 
plaintiff appointments, should they seek them.72  Table 1, below, reports basic 
statistics on the Largest Funds.   
68 JUN PENG, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT 13 (CRC Press 2008).  
69 JULIA K. BONAFEDE ET AL., 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT ON STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS:
FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION (Mar. 12, 2004),13, app. A available at:
http://www.wilshire.com/Company/2004_State_Retirement_Funding_Report.pdf. 
(reflecting sum of actuarial values of retirement systems’ assets). 
70 Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures used in this Article are from 2003-04. 
71 The Top 200 Pension Funds/Sponsors, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 26, 2004, at 16.   
72 Pension funds often team up with other pension funds to seek co-lead plaintiff 
appointments.  These coalitions, frequently organized by lead counsel trying to maximize 
the chances of their clients obtaining lead plaintiff appointments, could allow two or more 
funds with smaller losses to aggregate those losses and “leapfrog” a single lead plaintiff 
candidate whose loss is larger than either of the smaller pension funds’ losses.  This fact 
should not undermine the hypothesis that one would expect the Largest Funds to obtain the 
most lead plaintiff appointments, as they are also the most attractive clients for plaintiff 
lawyers and are most attractive as aggregation partners. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for the Largest Public Pension Funds 
N=53 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Asset Size73 $33,896 $29,031 $9,051 $24,710 $148,840
Board Size 9 3.69 1 9 18
Polit. 1.189 1.594 0 1 7
Polit. Appts. 3.708 2.619 0 4 10
Benefs. 3.858 3.27 0 4 14
Polit./Apptrs. 2.17 1.566 0 2 8
Finan. Experts 0.66 1.58 0 0 7
Social Invest. 1.038 1.754 0 0 6
The mean asset size for these Largest Funds is approximately $33.9 billion, 
and the median is approximately $24.7 billion.  The mean, and median, board 
size for the Largest Funds is nine members.  The median number of politicians 
is one, and the mean number of political appointees (“Polit. Appts.”) and 
beneficiaries are both four.  On average, politicians and their appointees 
outnumber beneficiaries on the boards of the Largest Funds five to four. 74  The 
number of appointers variable (“Polit./Apptrs.”) is distinguishable from 
politicians and political appointees.  It is a reference to the number of 
politicians who are either on the board or have appointing power to it; further, 
it is separate from the percentage of political control of a board.  Rather, it 
measures the dispersal of political influence on the board.  For the Largest 
Funds, the minimum number of appointers to the board is zero, the maximum 
is eight, and the median is two.  The “Finan. Experts” variable is the number of 
individuals with experience in the financial industry who are required to serve 
as a member of the board.  Board members with financial expertise are a rarity, 
and the median number of such experts on the boards is zero.  Finally, the 
“Social Invest.” variable is the score I assigned to the fund based on the 
number of social investment initiatives it maintains, on a scale of zero to 
eleven, with zero being no social investment initiatives (or an explicit 
prohibition on such initiatives) and eleven being the total number of different 
73 “Asset size” reported in millions of dollars, unless otherwise noted.   
74 Fourteen of the fifty-three Largest Funds contained at least one board member who 
was both a political appointee and a beneficiary.  I coded such beneficiary appointees as half 
of an appointee, and half of a beneficiary.  For the remaining thirty-nine Largest Funds, the 
categories of political appointees and beneficiaries were mutually exclusive.  Interestingly, 
my data suggests that beneficiary appointees behave more like political appointees than like 
beneficiaries.  See infra Part III.B.   
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social initiatives I have seen across all funds.  No entity in the sample received 
a score higher than six on this scale. 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the Largest Funds by board orientation: 
Table 2 
Largest Funds by Orientation of the Board of Trustees 
N=53 
Majority Politicians and Their 
Appointees
32
Majority Beneficiaries 12
Majority Neither75 9
Thus, among the Largest Funds, those dominated by politicians outnumber 
those dominated by beneficiaries, thirty-two to twelve, while nine funds have 
majorities of neither elected officials nor beneficiaries. 
B. Lead Plaintiff Appointments of the Largest Public Pension Funds 
There were 824 securities fraud class actions filed between January 1, 2003 
and December 31, 2006.76  During this time period, public pension funds 
served as lead plaintiffs in 127 (15% of) cases.77  If one counts co-lead plaintiff 
appointments, public pension funds obtained 187 lead plaintiff appointments in 
these 127 cases.78  Just 49 of the 187 lead plaintiff and co-lead plaintiff 
appointments were obtained by Largest Funds,79 representing only 26% of all 
public pension fund appointments.  These 49 lead plaintiff appointments were 
obtained by just 20 of the Largest Funds – the remaining 33 of the Largest 
Funds obtained no lead plaintiff appointments at all. 
The relatively small number of lead plaintiff appointments obtained by the 
Largest Funds suggests that these funds frequently forego the opportunity to be 
appointed lead plaintiff.  Such funds have losses that are large enough to 
qualify them for a lead plaintiff appointment, or at least large enough to make 
them attractive as co-applicants for a lead plaintiff appointment with other 
75 Some funds have majorities of neither elected officials nor beneficiaries.  In some 
instances, some board members have ex officio positions that they owe to neither elected 
officials nor beneficiaries, such as the head of a state or local board of education, or a state 
or local hospital.  In addition, some boards may have an even number of elected officials or 
appointees and beneficiaries, and these board members jointly choose the tie-breaking vote-
caster.  Only two of the Largest Funds fall into the “neither” category.  As will be seen 
below, some of the Filer funds also fall into this category. 
76 SCAS Dataset (on file with author). 
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 I excluded the Ontario Teachers Retirement System from the Largest Funds, because it 
is based in Canada. 
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funds, but they choose not to seek it.  It may also be the case that some of the 
Largest Funds have simply failed to obtain lead plaintiff appointments after 
repeated efforts to do so.80  The Largest Funds could also be forgoing 
participation in securities class actions either because they are avoiding 
litigation entirely, or, less likely, because they are opting out of the class to 
pursue a separate action against the defendants.81
Table 3 contains eight regression models for the Largest Funds, which 
regress several board variables against the number of lead plaintiff 
appointments obtained by the funds, ranging from zero to eight appointments.  
The variables include: the percentage of each board that consists of politicians, 
political appointees, beneficiaries, and financial experts; whether the board is 
composed of a political or beneficiary majority; the number of politicians on 
the board or with appointing power to it; and the number of social investment 
initiatives maintained by each fund, if any.  I also used the fund’s board size 
and the natural log of its asset size as control variables.  Again, assuming that 
pay-to-play occurs, one would expect that the coefficients for politicians and 
their appointees would correlate statistically significantly with lead plaintiff 
appointments. 
80 Choi and Fisch report that 37.5% of the largest public pension funds in their sample 
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a lead plaintiff appointment at least once.  Choi & Fisch, 
supra note 40, at 331. 
81 For a comprehensive discussion of the growing practice of institutional investors 
opting out of securities class actions, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and 
Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better Than “Voice”, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 409-10 (2008) [hereinafter Accountability and Competition].  Note 
that Coffee suggests that the first major securities case in which investors, including some 
public pension funds, opted out was the WorldCom case.  Id. at 426.  After losing the 
WorldCom lead plaintiff appointment, plaintiff lawyer William Lerach persuaded sixty-five 
of his clients to opt out of the class, including several public pension funds.  Lorraine 
Woellert, Fractured Class Actions: “Opt Outs” Are a Growing Headache for Companies,
BUS. WK., Feb, 27, 2006, at 31.  The WorldCom opt out actions were settled in 2005.  
Accountability and Competition, supra at 426.  Coffee further describes the opt-out 
“floodgates” opening for the AOL Time Warner securities class action, for which the opt-out 
actions were settled in 2007.  Id. at 427.  Most opt outs occur after a settlement in the class 
actions has been reached.  Id. at 430.  In Time Warner, Lerach persuaded ninety-three state 
public pension funds to opt-out.  Woellert, supra at 31.  Thus, the ostensible new trend 
towards opting-out appears to have begun at the tail end, or even after the time period 
studied in this Article, 2003-2006.  Choi and Fisch report that of the twenty-four funds (not 
limited to just the largest funds) that responded to their opt-out question, sixty percent 
responded that they opted out.  Choi & Fisch, supra note 40, at 331.  These results may be 
explained by the WorldCom and AOL Time Warner opt outs.   
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Table 3, Model 5 demonstrates that the coefficient for boards with a political 
majority is both negative and significant at the ten percent confidence level.  
The coefficients for politicians and their appointees are, again, both negative, 
at Models 1 and 3, although not statistically significant.  In contrast, Table 3 
demonstrates that the number of beneficiary board members correlates 
positively and statistically significantly with lead plaintiff appointments, at the 
5% confidence level in Models 2 and 4, and at the 1% confidence level in 
Models 6 and 7.  The coefficient for boards with a majority of beneficiary 
board members is both positive and significant at the 1% confidence level in 
Model 6.  Finally, the coefficient for the number of appointers to the board is 
both positive and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level in Models 
6 and 7, and the 10% confidence level in Models 5 and 8.  For each additional 
politician with appointing power to the board, which is a measure of the 
dispersal of political influence, and not control, (see below), the fund’s lead 
plaintiff appointments increase.82
These regressions show that the presence of politicians and their appointees 
correlates negatively and statistically significantly with lead plaintiff 
appointments when this population constitutes a board majority; the percentage 
of beneficiaries correlates positively and statistically significantly with lead 
plaintiff appointments in all models.  While the implications of this finding for 
the pay-to-play theory will be discussed in further detail below, in light of 
additional data, the regressions described above contradict the second 
hypothesis that politicians on public pension fund boards will correlate 
positively with lead plaintiff appointments.  As noted, if pay-to-play were 
driving pension fund securities litigation activism, one would expect political 
influence to positively, not negatively, correlate with lead plaintiff 
appointments.  Indeed, this data suggests a new theory that has not been 
discussed in the securities class action literature, a theory I will call “pay-not-
to-play.”  Just as politicians can, and do, receive significant campaign 
contributions from, or are otherwise influenced by, plaintiffs’ lawyers, they 
also receive contributions from, and are influenced by, Fortune 500 companies, 
accounting firms, technology firms, investment banks, and pro-business 
lobbies such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  Politicians may choose to 
encourage or discourage the litigation activism of public pension funds that 
they influence or control, depending upon their personal political ideology, the 
identity of their donors, and the political pressures they face.  I will further 
discuss both pay-to-play and pay-not-to-play83 below, in light of additional 
data. 
82 See supra Table 1 and accompanying text for a description of this appointment power. 
83 By “pay-not-to-play,” I am not suggesting that politicians receive campaign 
contributions from potential or actual defendants expressly in return for protection from 
litigation.  Instead, I suggest that politicians of both political parties are highly dependent on 
campaign contributions from the business community and are sensitive to actions that are 
deemed hostile to that community, including litigating against its members. 
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The correlation between the number of politicians either on the board or 
with appointing power to it and lead plaintiff appointments is intriguing.  It is 
important to distinguish this variable from measures of political control over 
the board.  Unlike the politicians and political appointee variables, the number-
of-appointers variable is not a measure of elected official control but of the 
dispersal of elected official influence, as noted above.  The results for this “# 
Appointers” variable mean that, for example, a board with four of its members 
appointed by four separate politicians (Board A) will seek more lead plaintiff 
appointments than a board with four of its members appointed by one 
politician (Board B).  It may be that funds with a greater dispersal of elected 
official influence are less able to thwart lead plaintiff appointments sought by 
beneficiaries.  It may also be that politicians become increasingly indifferent to 
obtaining or forgoing lead plaintiff appointments once “blame” for such 
appointments becomes shared by other politicians.  A politician who can point 
to the other politicians with influence on Board A who voted to pursue a lead 
plaintiff appointment is better able to deflect criticism from unhappy 
constituents or campaign contributors than a politician on Board B who is 
solely responsible for Board B’s decisions.   
This correlation between the number of appointers and lead plaintiff 
appointments further undermines the pay-to-play theory.  Assuming pay-to-
play were the driving force in the funds’ pursuit of lead plaintiff appointments, 
one would expect that the ideal board from the perspective of a plaintiffs’ 
lawyer would be one that is majority-controlled by one politician, as the lawyer 
would save money on campaign contributions and time spent in developing 
political relationships, while offering a more certain return on investment.  Put 
cynically, Board B is more cheaply bought than Board A.  The fact that Board 
A is more active than Board B suggests that pay-to-play is not what motivates 
boards to obtain lead plaintiff appointments.  As discussed below, pay-not-to-
play could be restraining politically-dominated funds from obtaining lead 
plaintiff appointments. 
Finally, as a subsidiary point, the boards of fourteen of the Largest Funds 
contained at least one political appointee who was also a beneficiary.84  For the 
remaining funds, political appointees and beneficiaries are mutually exclusive.  
Interestingly, of these fourteen funds, eleven obtained no lead plaintiff 
appointments, suggesting that, on balance, an appointed beneficiary behaves 
more like an appointee than a beneficiary. Therefore, she is more likely to 
follow the appointing politician in shunning lead plaintiff appointments than to 
follow beneficiaries in pursuing them.  This result coheres with research 
suggesting that beneficiary appointees behave more like appointees than like 
beneficiaries.85  Similarly, of the seventy-eight Litigating Funds discussed 
below, only four contained at least one board member who was an appointed 
84 Because such beneficiary appointees fall into both the beneficiary and appointee 
categories, I split such board members by coding them as a 0.5 in each category.   
85 Romano, supra note 11, at 826-27. 
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beneficiary.  On average, these four funds obtained 1.75 lead plaintiff 
appointments, compared to 2.5 appointments for the Litigating Funds overall, 
again suggesting that appointed beneficiaries tend to follow the trend of elected 
officials in resisting lead plaintiff appointments.   
C. Who Controls the Litigating Funds? 
As noted above, I report results for seventy-eight funds that obtained at least 
one lead-plaintiff appointment from 2003-2006.86  The Litigating Funds 
obtained as few as one and as many as nine lead-plaintiff appointments.  The 
Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit (Detroit P&F), with 
assets of $3.8 billion, obtained nine lead-plaintiff appointments in the four-year 
period, more than any other fund.  The Mississippi Public Employees 
Retirement System, with assets of $15.4 billion, obtained eight appointments in 
the same time period, second only to Detroit P&F.87  Table 4 below contains 
descriptive statistics for the Litigating Funds.   
86 In fact, eighty-one public pension funds obtained lead plaintiff appointments from 
2003-2006.  I excluded Ontario because it is based in Canada.  I further excluded two other 
funds because I could not find sufficient data for them. 
87 The PSLRA added a “professional plaintiff” restriction to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, stating that a person may be a lead plaintiff in no more than five securities class 
actions during any three year period, “[e]xcept as the court may otherwise permit.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2006).  Detroit P&F, MSPERS, the City of Dearborn Heights 
Police & Fire Retirement System, the Teachers Retirement System of the State of Ohio, and 
the City of Dearborn Heights General Employees Retirement System all appear to have 
been appointed more than five times in a three year period.  According to a House of 
Representatives Conference Report: 
Institutional investors . . . may need to exceed this limitation and do not represent the 
type of professional plaintiff this legislation seeks to restrict.  As a result, the 
Conference Committee grants courts discretion to avoid the unintended consequence of 
disqualifying institutional investors from serving more than five times in three years. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-396, at 35 (1999).  See also In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. 
Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (selecting an institutional investor as lead plaintiff 
even though the institution had served as lead plaintiff in more than five actions within the 
last three years).  Some scholars have also argued that it is appropriate to exempt plaintiffs 
from the professional plaintiff restriction, especially where an institutional investor has 
developed a strong track record as a lead plaintiff.  See, e.g., Does the Plaintiff Matter?,
supra note 25, at 1638. 
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Table 4 
Litigating Funds Descriptive Statistics 
(N=78) 
Mean St. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Board Size 9.141 4.330 1 9 27
Asset Size $11,724 $23,249 $28 $2,029 $148,840
Politicians 1.385 1.789 0 1 12
Polit. Appts. 3.032 2.502 0 2.75 13
Benefs. 4.340 3.157 0 4 15.5
Polit./Apptrs. 1.974 1.377 0 2 8
# Finan. Experts. 0.385 1.416 0 0 10
Soc./Pol. 0.603 1.188 0 0 6
Influenced by the massive size of CalPERS, the mean asset size for the 
Litigating Funds is over $11 billion or slightly less than one-third of the mean 
asset size for the Largest Funds, which is $34 billion.  The median asset size is 
more telling: at $2 billion, it is just eight percent of the median asset size for 
the Largest Funds.88  Thus, the funds that obtain lead plaintiff appointments are 
significantly smaller than the funds Congress expected would obtain lead 
plaintiff appointments.  For example, the diminutive Deerfield Beach Non-
Uniformed Municipal Employees Retirement System, with just $51 million in 
total assets, obtained three lead plaintiff appointments, more than CalPERS, 
which is 2902 times larger and was only appointed twice.  While Deerfield 
Beach is an extreme example, as is CalPERS, Largest Funds compose just 
twenty-six percent of the Litigating Funds. 
Likewise, while median board size for both the Litigating Funds and the 
Largest Funds is nine, the composition of that board differs.  The median 
Largest Fund board contains five politicians or political appointees versus four 
beneficiaries; the median Litigating Funds board contains four beneficiaries to 
3.75 politicians, with between one and two unaffiliated board seats.  Table 5 
compares the board orientation of the Largest Funds to the Litigating Funds. 
88 See supra Table 3. 
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Table 5 
Largest Funds Versus Litigating Funds  
by Orientation of the Board of Trustees 
 Largest Funds 
N=53
Litigating Funds 
N=78
Majority Politicians and 
their Appointees
32 33 
Majority Beneficiaries 12 23
Majority Neither89 9 22
Chi-Square Test P-Value 0.116
A two-way table chi-square test, demonstrates that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the two datasets in the distribution of funds by 
orientation of the boards of trustees. 
D. Lead Plaintiff Appointments of the Litigating Funds 
As aforementioned, the 78 public pension funds in my Litigating Funds 
sample obtained 187 lead plaintiff appointments between January 1, 2003 and 
December 31, 2006, out of 824 securities class actions.90  Table 6 contains the 
same model regressions for the Litigating Funds that appear in Table 3 for the 
Largest Funds.   
89 Some funds have majorities of neither elected officials nor beneficiaries.  In some 
instances, some board members have ex officio positions that they owe to neither elected 
officials nor beneficiaries, such as the head of a state or local board of education, or a state 
or local hospital.  In addition, some boards may have an even number of elected officials or 
appointees and beneficiaries, and these board members jointly choose the tie-breaking vote.  
Just two of the Largest Funds fall into the “neither” category.  As will be seen below, some 
of the Filer Funds also fall into this category. 
90 Usually, they would be appointed as co-lead plaintiffs with other public pension funds, 
so the number of cases with at least one public pension fund as lead plaintiff is less than 
187. 
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As with the Largest Funds, the regressions for the Litigating Funds in Table 
6 show that the number of beneficiary board members positively and 
statistically significantly correlates with lead plaintiff appointments in all 
models at the one percent confidence level.  The number of politicians and 
political appointees correlates negatively with such appointments, statistically 
significantly so in Models 1 and 3 at the 10% and 5% confidence levels.  The 
negative correlation between politicians, political appointees, and lead plaintiff 
appointments is even stronger for the Litigating Funds than it is for the Largest 
Funds, although the negative coefficient for boards controlled by a political 
majority was not statistically significant.  As with the Largest Funds, the 
number of appointers to the board positively and statistically significantly 
correlates with lead plaintiff appointments, in all models, and presumably for 
the same reasons.  Unlike the Largest Funds, here, board size is negative and 
statistically significant in all models containing a beneficiaries variable.  The 
Pearson correlation91 of board size and beneficiaries percentage on the board is 
0.338 with a p-value of 0.002.  Thus, board size becomes negative and 
statistically significant once beneficiaries are considered.  
To examine the Litigating Funds in further depth, I also ran ordinal logistic 
regressions, dividing the funds into subcategories of those that obtained (a) one 
lead plaintiff appointment; (b) two to four lead plaintiff appointments; and (c) 
five or more lead plaintiff appointments between 2003 and 2006.  The 
regressions below in Table 7 measure the chances of (a) becoming (b) and (c), 
and of (a) and (b) becoming (c).  
91 Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: 
Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1147-48 
(2008) (‘“Pearson’s Correlation is a way of summarizing the strength of a linear relationship 
between two variables with a single figure that ranges between [-]1 and +1.  The stronger 
the relationship between the variables the closer the correlation is to +/-1.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
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Table 7 echoes Table 6 in almost all respects, with beneficiaries positively 
and significantly correlated with lead plaintiff appointments, and politicians 
negatively and significantly correlated with lead plaintiff appointments.  Model 
5 is the only model of all the regressions in this Article in which the number of 
appointers variable is not statistically significant.  Of particular note in this 
regression is that two of the social investment criteria are positive and 
statistically significant, which will be analyzed below in Part III.F.  
E. The Never-Appointed Funds 
Thirty-three of the fifty-three Largest Funds obtained no lead plaintiff 
appointments.  Based on the above conclusions, one would hypothesize that 
the Never-Appointed Funds would have more politicians and their appointees 
on their boards, fewer appointers to the board, and fewer beneficiaries on the 
board.  Table 8 illustrates basic statistics for the Never-Appointed Funds, as 
compared with the Largest Funds that obtained lead plaintiff appointments (the 
“Largest Appointed Funds”).   
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Table 8 
Never-Appointed Funds Versus Largest Appointed Funds 
*=P value from two sided t-test of difference in means. 
To some extent, the Never-Appointed Funds mirror the Largest Appointed 
Funds in terms of political domination: on average, politicians and their 
appointees make up 59.2% of Never-Appointed Funds boards, compared with 
58.2% of Largest Appointed Funds boards.  The distribution of that domination 
differs slightly, as 15.3% of the Never-Appointed Funds boards are composed 
of politicians themselves, compared with 21.3% of Largest Appointed Funds 
boards, with Never-Appointed Funds having 1 politician, and Largest 
Appointed Funds 1.5, on average.  On the other hand, as expected, the Never-
Appointed Funds contain fewer appointers to the board (1.788 versus 2.8) and 
a smaller percentage of beneficiaries (34.4% versus 41.1%).  Thus, the higher 
number of beneficiaries on the Largest Appointed Funds boards, combined 
with a greater dispersal of elected official influence, may help tip the balance 
in favor of lead plaintiff appointments when compared with the Never-
Appointed Funds boards.  Moreover, the smaller absolute and relative number 
of politicians on Never-Appointed Funds boards may also play a role in 
 Largest Funds 
That Never 
Obtained 
Lead Plaintiff 
Appointment 
(LP = 0)
Largest Funds 
That Obtained 
Lead Plaintiff 
Appointment(s) 
(LP > 0) 
P Value
Board Size 
(mean)
8.364 10.050 0.107 
Asset Size 
(mean/median) 
31,082/20,272 38,540/26,995 0.370 
% Polit.  
(mean)
15.3% 
(1.0)
21.3% 
(1.5)
0.472 
% Polit. Appts. 
(mean)
43.9% 
(3.758)
37.0% 
(3.625)
0.424 
% Total Political 
(mean)
59.2% 
(4.758)
58.2% 
(5.125)
0.431 
# Apptrs. (mean) (1.788) (2.8) 0.230
% Benefs. 
(mean) 
34.4% 
(3.273)
41.1% 
(4.825)
0.352 
% Finan. Exp. 
(mean) 
9.5% 
(0.727)
6.3% 
(0.550)
0.582 
# Social Invest. 
(mean)
(0.788) (1.45) 0.185 
N 33 20
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keeping these funds on the sidelines of securities litigation.  With one 
politician on average controlling the Never-Appointed Funds, compared to one 
and a half for the Largest Appointed Funds, the lone politician can more easily 
exert control over her board.  But these are at best tentative suggestions, as the 
structural differences between the Never-Appointed Funds and the Largest 
Appointed Funds are relatively small and not statistically significant.  
One factor that may explain the difference between Never-Appointed Funds 
and Largest Appointed Funds is “pay-not-to-play,” as discussed in Part V 
below.  It may be that the Never-Appointed Funds are primarily located in 
states or cities in which the business community plays an unusually large and 
active role, making the politicians on these boards disproportionately reluctant 
to act against that community’s interests.  Conversely, Largest Appointed 
Funds boards may find themselves in states or cities in which the business 
community is either more muted or counterbalanced by some other interest 
group, organized labor, for example.  The pay-not-to-play concept is discussed 
in further detail below, at Part V.   
F. Financial Experts on Pension Fund Boards 
While almost all funds will provide some financial training to their board 
members, only a small minority of funds require that at least one board 
member have prior experience in the financial industry.  The relative dearth of 
financial experts on pension fund boards may be explained, in part, by prior 
research that demonstrates that board members’ formal financial expertise does 
not correlate with fund performance.92  The small percentage of funds that are 
required to have at least one financial expert on the board does not mean that 
most boards have no access to financial expertise.93  Many funds require their 
board members to undergo at least some financial training.  Moreover, all 
funds employ, either directly, or through outside consulting and advisory 
relationships, financial experts who are not board members.  And just because 
the fund is not required to have at least one board member with prior 
experience in the financial industry does not mean that politicians or 
beneficiaries cannot select someone with such experience.   
I hypothesize that financial experts would negatively correlate with lead 
plaintiff appointments, if at all, for three reasons.  First, many financial experts 
are political appointees, and one would expect them to resist lead plaintiff 
appointments as their appointers do.  Second, compared to other board 
members, financial experts may be more likely to view the potential for a 
securities class action in purely financial terms.  As discussed above in Part 
I.B., the financial stakes for public pension funds are relatively low in any 
given securities class action, both in terms of the fund’s losses relative to its 
92 Romano, supra note 11, at 840. 
93 See, e.g., id. at 841 (stating that some states have established advisory councils of 
individuals with investment expertise who submit recommendations to the boards 
concerning investment strategy). 
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asset size, and the likelihood of a small recovery.  Financial experts may be 
less inclined to view a securities class action in moral or deterrent terms, as a 
question of the fund taking action to recover assets of which it had been 
defrauded and punishing the wrongdoers, regardless of the relative size of the 
loss.  Indeed, by making the presumptive lead plaintiff the individual or entity 
that lost the most money in absolute terms, and not the individual or entity that 
lost the most money relative to its own asset size, Congress and the PSLRA 
emphasize raw losses in terms of dollars, rather than in terms of the relative 
financial “pain” the victim suffers.  Financial experts may take the view that 
the pain is often slight, unlikely to be wholly remedied, and simply not worth 
the costs, low as those costs may be.   
Third, people with prior experience in the financial services industry may be 
less inclined to view conduct in the industry as fraudulent.  They may have 
more sympathy for potential defendants, and they may take a more skeptical 
view of plaintiffs’ lawyers and the benefits of litigation than people who have 
not worked in the industry. 
The data on financial experts and lead plaintiff appointments are 
inconclusive.  None of the results are statistically significant, and thus I can 
neither prove nor disprove the hypotheses regarding the role of financial 
experts on public pension fund boards.   
G. Social Investment Criteria and Litigation Activism 
The Social Investment Forum defines “socially responsible investing” as 
investing that (1) recognizes that corporate responsibility and societal concerns 
are valid parts of investment decisions; (2) considers both the investor’s 
financial needs and an investment’s impact on society; and (3) encourages 
corporations to improve their practices on environmental, social, and 
governance issues.94  Social investment criteria take different forms.  They 
may involve “screening” investment portfolios to include performers deemed 
socially responsible95 and excluding performers deemed not to be.96  Socially 
94 Socially Responsible Investing Facts, SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM,
http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/sriguide/srifacts.cfm (last visited on May 18, 2010). 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) is a broad-based approach to investing that now 
encompasses an estimated $2.71 trillion out of $25.1 trillion in the U.S. investment 
marketplace today.  SRI recognizes that corporate responsibility and societal concerns 
are valid parts of investment decisions. SRI considers both the investor’s financial 
needs and an investment’s impact on society. SRI investors encourage corporations to 
improve their practice on environmental, social, and governance issues. 
Id.
95 Id. (stating that socially responsible performers may include those with “good 
employer-employee relations, strong environmental practices, products that are safe and 
useful, and operations that respect human rights around the world”). 
96 Socially Responsible Mutual Funds Charts: Screening & Advocacy, SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT FORUM, http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/mfpc/screening.cfm (last visited 
on May 18, 2010) (including as a form of screening the exclusion of investments in tobacco 
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responsible investing may also involve community or local investing, or 
shareholder advocacy.97  The Uniform Management of Public Employee 
Retirement Systems Act (UMPERS) allows investors to consider social 
investments as long as such investments are themselves prudent, irrespective of 
their collateral social benefits.98
There is an ongoing debate about whether such investments harm the funds 
that adopt them.  As Meir Statman described it, the debate concerns whether 
social investment criteria are about “doing well while doing good” or “doing 
good but not well.”99  A recent paper, co-authored by Statman, concludes that 
social investors incur a return disadvantage relative to conventional investors 
because they screen out “stocks of companies associated with tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, firearms, military, and nuclear operations.”100  Investors who tilt 
their portfolios toward companies with high social responsibility scores – 
without screening out the low-scoring companies – actually outperform 
conventional investors.101  Some advocates of social investment criteria have 
claimed that such investments can be structured to offer rates of return that are 
equivalent to those made purely to maximize profits,102 while still other studies 
support the conclusion that social investing has no effect on fund 
performance.103  Some critics of social investing assert that social investment 
criteria reflect the degree of political interference in the fund, arguing that 
companies). 
97 See Socially Responsible Investing Facts, supra note 94. 
98 UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT, § 8(a)(5) (amended 1997), 7A U.L.A. 63-64 
(2004) (“In investing and managing assets of a retirement system . . . a trustee with authority 
to invest and manage assets . . . may consider benefits created by an investment in addition 
to investment return only if the trustee determines that the investment providing these 
collateral benefits would be prudent even without the collateral benefits.”).   
99 Meir Statman, Socially Responsible Investments 1, 10, 11 (June 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=995271 (describing the two hypotheses); see also Romano, supra
note 11, at 798 (concluding that  there is an inverse relation between return on investments 
and policies favoring social investing for public pension funds). 
100 Meir Statman & Denys Glushkov, The Wages of Social Responsibility 1 (December 
2008), http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/research/documents/2008WinningPrize-
Moskowitz.pdf. 
101 Id.
102 Performance and Socially Responsible Investments, SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM,
http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/performance.cfm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (“A 
growing number of academic studies have demonstrated that [Socially Responsible 
Investment] mutual funds perform competitively with non-SRI funds over time . . . .  The 
longest-running SRI index, the FTSE KLD 400, was started in 1990.  Since that time, it has 
continued to perform competitively – with 9.51 percent total returns through December 31, 
2009, compared with 8.66 percent for the S&P 500 over the same period.”). 
103 Hess, supra note 11, at 211; see also Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén, Investment 
Practices of State and Local Pension Funds: Implications for Social Security Reform, in
PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 153, 173-74 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead eds., 
2001). 
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funds that maintain such criteria do so at the behest of politicians who are 
interested in using the fund’s resources to please assorted constituents at the 
expense of maximizing returns for beneficiaries.104  The funds that maintain 
such criteria claim altruistic motives for them.105
I found a dozen varieties of social investment criteria across the 111 funds in 
my Largest Funds and Litigating Funds samples.  These criteria include 
investments in: (1) women-owned businesses; (2) minority-owned businesses; 
(3) disabled-owned businesses; (4) urban renewal; (5) rural reinvestment; (6) 
“economically targeted investments,” usually defined as investments to 
improve the local or national economy;106 (7) environmentally-friendly 
businesses; (8) affordable housing or home loans; (9) businesses that maintain 
“responsible contractor” policies that pay “fair wages,” often by hiring union 
labor; (10) the city or state in which the fund is domiciled; and divestment 
from (11) tobacco companies and (12) companies that do business in Northern 
Ireland and tolerate discrimination on the basis of religion (the “MacBride 
Principles”).  I found no funds that maintained a policy of divestment from 
South Africa (known as the “Sullivan Principles”) – a social investment 
criterion once widely adopted by public pension funds107 – presumably 
because the funds now believe such a policy to be obsolete.  Naturally, there is 
some overlap among the social investment categories enumerated above. 
Nineteen of the fifty-three Largest Funds (thirty-six percent) and twenty-five 
of the seventy-eight Litigating Funds (thirty-two percent) maintain social 
investment criteria of some kind.  I hypothesized that social investment criteria 
would positively correlate with lead plaintiff appointments, reasoning that 
funds that were activist in managing their investments would also be activist in 
litigating over investment losses caused by fraud. 
In Tables 3 and 6, social investment criteria regressed against lead plaintiff 
appointments yielded no statistically significant results, although all of the 
104 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 11, at 801-02. 
105 For example, several public pension funds are members of CERES, “a national 
network of investors, environmental organizations and other public interest groups working 
with companies and investors to address sustainability challenges such as global climate 
change.”  About Us, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=415 (last visited May 20, 
2010).  Jorge Torres, Special Assistant to the Administrator of the Puerto Rican Government 
Employees’ Retirement System, told me that the fund did not have social investment 
criteria.  But it was aware that other funds maintained such criteria and that it was looking to 
adopt some such criteria of its own, “because it is the right thing to do.”  Telephone 
Interview with Jorge Torres, Special Assistant to the Administrator of the Puerto Rican 
Government Employees’ Retirement System (Dec. 5, 2008).     
106 In 1994, the U.S. Department of Labor published Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 allowing 
public pension funds to make “Economically Targeted Investments” which are “investments 
selected for the economic benefits they create apart from their investment return to the 
employee benefit plan.”  29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (2009). 
107 Romano, supra note 11, at 809 (identifying eighteen state public pension funds with 
restrictions on investing in South Africa). 
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coefficients for social investment criteria were positive.  But in Table 7, 
ordinal logistic regressions did yield two statistically significant results, 
showing a positive correlation between social investment criteria and lead 
plaintiff appointments, lending some support to my hypothesis.  However, 
because the results are not very robust, I am reluctant to conclude that such a 
connection clearly exists.  Perhaps further research will affirm or reject this 
suggested connection, but based on the data presented here, I can neither 
accept nor reject the hypothesis that social investment criteria correlate with 
lead plaintiff appointments. 
Table 9 reports results from two sample t-tests run on both the Largest 
Funds and Litigating Funds samples.   
Table 9 
Two Sample T-Tests of Social Investment 
Largest Funds 
Litigating Funds 
 N=78 Politicians on 
Board (mean)
# Appointers 
(mean)
No Social 
Investment 
Criteria
53 1.32 1.64 
At least one Social 
Investment 
Criterion
25 1.52 2.68 
P-Value 0.620 0.001***
*=statistically significant at 0.10; **=statistically significant at 0.05; 
***=statistically significant at 0.01.  P-values are in parentheses. 
Table 9 shows that funds that have at least one social investment criterion 
have more politicians on their boards.  This result is statistically significant for 
the Largest Funds.  Table 9 also shows that funds that have at least one social 
investment criterion have more elected officials on the board or with 
appointing power to it, which is statistically significant for the Largest Funds at 
 N=53 Politicians on 
Board (mean)
# Appointers 
(mean)
No Social 
Investment 
Criteria
34 0.91 1.85 
At Least one 
Social Investment 
Criterion
19 1.68 2.74 
P-Value 0.091* 0.048**
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the 5% confidence level and for the Litigating Funds at the 1% confidence 
level.  No such relationship was found for beneficiaries and social investments.  
The correlation between social investment criteria and politicians, the lack 
thereof between such criteria and beneficiaries, and the even higher correlation 
between social investment criteria and the dispersal of elected official 
influence, provide some support for the view that social investment criteria are 
a reflection of political pressure exerted on a fund.  This last relationship 
suggests that social investment criteria are most likely to exist where political 
accountability is at its lowest and most dispersed.  Politicians correlate with 
such criteria, but politicians who have cover from other politicians correlate 
most strongly with them.   
IV. WHY DO BENEFICIARY BOARD MEMBERS SEEK LEAD PLAINTIFF 
APPOINTMENTS?
Previous research comparing beneficiary and politician board members 
provides some insight into why beneficiary board members may seek lead 
plaintiff appointments.  Roberta Romano hypothesized that “board members 
who are elected by plan participants and are themselves fund beneficiaries are 
likely to be less susceptible to political influence or pressure because their 
personal retirement funds are at stake and their positions do not depend on the 
good graces of state officials.”108  Romano asserts that the correlation between 
improved pension fund performance and elected beneficiary board members 
coheres with the corporate finance literature showing that corporate 
performance correlates positively with the proportion of equity owned by 
management.109  Michael Hess similarly compared beneficiary board members 
to independent, outside directors of a corporation, noting that the lack of 
political interference in outside directors’ selection allows them to focus on 
shareholder interests and monitor their politically-affiliated counterparts.110
Romano found that the higher the number of beneficiaries on a public 
pension fund board – and the fewer politicians and their appointees – the 
higher the fund’s returns,111 supporting her hypothesis that “compared to 
boards with beneficiary-elected members, boards without elected members 
choose riskier social investments within asset classes, where the increased risk 
is firm-specific and hence not priced.”112  Hess, on the other hand, found that 
beneficiary-elected trustees had an inverted U-shape relationship with fund 
108 Id. at 820. 
109 Id. at 821. 
110 Hess, supra note 11, at 198. 
111 Romano, supra note 11, at 825. 
112 Id. at 827.  These findings and hypotheses also cohere with Romano’s view that social 
investment criteria are a measure not of a fund’s altruism but of political meddling by 
elected officials eager to divert the fund’s resources to state and local investments and 
towards their constituencies.  Id. at 801-11 (describing examples of investments used for a 
broader social purpose at the expense of fund beneficiaries). 
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performance: beneficiary-elected trustees improved fund performance up until 
they constituted about half of the board, but performance dropped as 
beneficiary-elected trustees came to dominate the board.113  Still, Hess 
concludes that “[m]ember-elected trustees’ dedication to their duties also 
appears to be beneficial to plan financial performance.”114  Such trustees “are 
motivated, accountable to plan beneficiaries, and independent of political 
influence.”115  Both Romano and Hess recommend increasing the number of 
elected beneficiary board members to reduce the politicization of public 
pension funds.116
Romano’s and Hess’s conclusions provide some context for evaluating why 
beneficiary board members pursue securities fraud class actions.  Beneficiary 
board members have their own money at stake – and those of their peers and 
co-workers – when making decisions for the fund in the same way that 
managers do in making decisions for a company in which they have equity.  
For such board members, alleged frauds and portfolio losses affect them 
personally, not merely in their roles as fiduciaries.  From a fund-wide 
perspective, there may be little reason why politically-dominated funds should 
be less motivated to bring class actions than beneficiary-dominated funds.  The 
same considerations of maximizing recoveries,117 punishing wrongdoing, 
deterring future frauds, protecting investments, and instituting corporate 
governance reforms apply equally to both types of funds.  But the personal 
investment of beneficiary board members may make them less inclined to 
allow some other institution or individual to lead the class and select class 
counsel.  The fact that they can be held directly accountable to the 
beneficiaries who elect them may make them more likely to obtain a lead 
plaintiff appointment, rather than respond passively.  It may also be that, just 
as beneficiary board members are associated with higher fund returns, 
beneficiary board members may actually obtain higher relative recoveries than 
their political counterparts, or may at least believe that they do.   
Moreover, it could be that these cases are simply popular among fund 
beneficiaries, and that, while elected official board members are committed to 
other constituencies, beneficiary trustees are elected by the beneficiaries alone.  
All of the fund beneficiaries in this sample are public employees.  They are 
police officers, firefighters, teachers, and other middle-class and working-class 
113 Hess, supra note 11, at 213-14. 
114 Id. at 217. 
115 Id. at 216. 
116 Id. at 217; Romano, supra note 11, at 799-800, 843-44. 
117 As noted above, institutional investor lead plaintiffs correlate with higher recoveries, 
though it remains unknown whether such investors are more effective lead plaintiffs or 
simply “cherry-pick” the best cases.  See, e.g., Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 25, at 
1601 & n.51 (citing Letter from Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 
to Cox and Thomas (Mar. 10, 2003) (stating that pension funds vastly increase their 
recovery by taking the lead plaintiff role)). 
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people.  As public employees, they are, for the most part, modestly 
compensated.  More than a third of them belong to unions.  Even if they have 
little pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case, they may be more likely to be 
offended by fraud, to want to pursue cases against corporate officials and 
corporations that commit fraud. Some public pension funds report that they 
believe serving as a lead plaintiff in a securities class action is simply the right 
thing to do, morally, for their members, and for the public.  Bobby Deal, 
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Jacksonville Police and Fire Pension 
Fund, described to me some of his fund’s motivation in obtaining lead plaintiff 
appointments: “Half of my guys carry axes, and the other half carry guns.  We 
put bad guys in jail for a living.  We are not about to sit back and let someone 
steal from our members and the investing public.  We are going to do 
something about it.”118  The fact that some funds proudly tout their 
involvement in securities litigation to their membership provides at least some 
support for this theory.119  The financial costs to defendants in litigating and 
settling such lawsuits, in addition to the potential embarrassment and exposure 
to those who committed the fraud, may motivate beneficiary board members to 
pursue such actions, even if the fund may have little to gain financially from 
the litigation.  Such litigations may also give board members an opportunity to 
demonstrate to beneficiaries that they are doing something on behalf of the 
members.  Securities litigation also provides a way for board members to build 
a record of achievement during their tenures in office.   
Another explanation for public pension fund participation in securities class 
actions is that unions influence and control the funds.  Some anecdotal 
evidence supports this view.  For example, Sean Harrigan, the controversial 
former President of CalPERS who was forced to resign (see discussion below 
at Section V), simultaneously served as a senior official in the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union (UFCWU).  Shortly following UFCWU’s four-
month long strike against Safeway, Harrigan and CalPERS led a proxy 
campaign against Safeway President Doug Burd, seeking Burd’s resignation.  
Harrigan was accused of using CalPERS’s position as a Safeway shareholder 
to further the UFCWU agenda.120  Regardless of whether this is true, it 
demonstrates the possibility that unions may use class actions to either further 
their own agendas or engage in coalition building with political partners, such 
as environmentalists, via various forms of shareholder activism.121  Moreover, 
118 Conversation with Bobby Deal, Assistant Police Chief and Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees of the Jacksonville Police and Fire Pension Fund (June 3, 2010). 
119 See., e.g., Paul O’Connell, Your Pension Matters: Pompano Beach Police & 
Firefighters’ Retirement System, NEWSLETTER (Dec. 31, 2006), http://pbpfrs. 
org/newsletter.htm (touting the firm’s role as lead plaintiff in four separate securities fraud 
class actions). 
120 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Investors, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1286 (2009). 
121 Ivan Osorio, Union Pension Funds Go Green: But It’s Not the Color of Money,
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thirty-six percent of public employees in the United States are unionized,122
compared to just twelve percent of private sector employees.  The fact that 
labor union funds are even more active in securities litigation than are public 
pension funds123 demonstrates that unions are interested in bringing such cases.   
A. Hypothesis Testing for Beneficiary Board Member Pursuit of Lead 
Plaintiff Appointments 
1. Beneficiary Litigation Activism and Unions  
To test the possibility that public pension fund participation in securities 
class actions may be driven by their degree of unionization, I analyzed state-
by-state data on the percentage of public employees that were unionized in 
2004.124  I hypothesized that the state-by-state percent unionization of public 
employees would correlate with lead plaintiff appointments obtained by 
statewide public pension funds within the state, the percentage of beneficiary 
board members serving on the boards of those public pension funds, and 
beneficiary control of those boards.  I found no correlation between percent 
unionization of public employees and either the number of lead plaintiff 
appointments or board composition.  This finding undermines but does not 
eliminate the notion that public pension fund lead plaintiff appointments are 
driven by unions.  
2. Beneficiary Pursuit of Lead Plaintiff Appointments and Pension Fund 
Underfunding 
Underfunding is a chronic and widespread problem for public pension 
funds.  In 2004, 73% of public pension funds were underfunded.125  While the 
consequences of underfunding may pose political problems for members of a 
LABOR WATCH, Sept. 2008, at 1-5, http://www.capitalresearch.org/pubs/pdf/v1219863905 
.pdf; see also Progressive Policy Institute, Making Green Waves (May 14, 2004), available 
at http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=116&subsecID=900039&contentID= 
252635. 
122 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Percent of employed, Government wage and salary 
workers, Members of unions, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost 
?lu (check the box for Series ID: LUU0204922700; then select “Retrieve Data”) (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2010). 
123 Motions for Lead Plaintiff, supra note 30, at 42 (finding that union pension funds 
constituted 16.5% of lead plaintiff appointments, and public pension funds constituted 
13.4% of such appointments). 
124 I obtained this data from a database assembled by Barry T. Hirsch and David A. 
Macpherson, at http://www.unionstats.com.  For a description of this database, see Barry T. 
Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the 
Current Population Survey: Note, 56 INDUST. & LABOR REL. REV. 349, 349 (Jan. 2003),  
available at http://unionstats.gsu.edu/UnionStats.pdf. 
125 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the percentage of underfunded funds has 
certainly increased. 
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pension fund board who are elected officials, beneficiary board members, like 
other beneficiaries, are personally impacted by underfunding.  An article in the 
Washington Post noted that underfunding forces funds to “[e]ither slash 
retirement benefits or pursue high-return investments that come with high 
risk.”126  For example, the underfunding of state pensions in New Jersey 
prompted its newly-elected Governor Chris Christie to propose capping sick 
leave payouts, mandating longer work weeks to qualify for benefits, and 
requiring beneficiaries to assume a greater share of their healthcare costs.127
There is great variation in public pension underfunding, and a few pensions 
are even overfunded.  I hypothesize that the degree of a pension fund’s 
underfunding correlates with lead plaintiff appointments.  Board members of 
underfunded funds – especially beneficiary board members – may be 
particularly concerned about the financial condition of the fund.  The fund’s 
vulnerability could potentially affect their own retirement funds, and those of 
their co-workers and, perhaps, family members.  Moreover, underfunding may 
make beneficiary board members’ seats more vulnerable to challenges from 
other board members.  Whereas politicians report to a broad constituency, 
beneficiary board members are responsible solely to the peer beneficiaries who 
elected them.  Taking a lead plaintiff role to maximize recovery, ensuring the 
future soundness of the investment through corporate governance reform, and 
deterring future wrongdoing by the defendant or other entities in whom the 
fund is invested could be a means for beneficiary board members to signal to 
other beneficiaries that they are active stewards for the fund’s finances.   
To assess whether the degree of underfunding could affect a fund’s pursuit 
of lead plaintiff appointments, I used a standard measure of a plan’s ability to 
pay its unfunded actuarial liability: the ratio of unfunded actuarial accrued 
liability (UAAL) to annual covered payroll as of the actuarial valuation date 
(UAAL variable).  The Governmental Accounting Standards Board requires 
public employee retirement plans to disclose this ratio.  I also used the simple 
funding ratio for each fund, which is the actuarial value of assets as a 
percentage of the actuarial accrued liability, although this measure is 
considered less reliable than the UAAL variable because of differences in 
actuarial assumptions, amortization periods, and valuation methods across 
funds.  I obtained these figures for the Largest Funds, when available.  I found 
that the higher a fund’s ratio of UAAL to annual covered payroll, the more 
lead plaintiff appointments the fund obtained, statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level (p-value 0.032).  When the UAAL variable is interacted with 
beneficiary control of the board, the statistical significance increases (p-value 
0.021); when it is interacted with political control of the board, the significance 
disappears.  This supports the notion that underfunding drives lead plaintiff 
126 David Cho, Steep Losses Pose Crisis for Pensions, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1. 
127 Claire Heininger, State to Seek Pension, Benefits Overhaul, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), Feb. 8, 2010, at 1. 
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appointments when beneficiaries control the fund, but has little influence when 
politicians control the fund.  
V. THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICIANS ON PENSION FUND LITIGATION ACTIVISM
This Article finds a negative correlation among politicians, their appointees, 
and lead plaintiff appointments.  This finding cannot be said to rule out either 
form of pay-to-play: campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
politicians with control over public pension funds may spur funds that would 
otherwise not seek a lead plaintiff appointment to obtain one, and to select the 
contributing lawyers as lead counsel.  Moreover, in certain instances, a 
politician may effectively control a board she does not actually control through 
majority vote, perhaps because she can find other ways to punish or reward 
board members she does not directly control.  But overall, the finding suggests 
that “pay-to-play,” to the extent it exists, is not driving most public pension 
fund litigation activism.  If pay-to-play were a significant factor in a public 
pension fund’s decision to become active in securities litigation, one would 
expect that politician board members would positively and highly correlate 
with lead plaintiff appointments.  That the correlation is negative both for the 
Largest Funds and the Litigating Funds, coupled with the fact that the category 
of funds that has the highest degree of political control is the Never-Appointed 
Funds, suggests that while pay-to-play may indeed be occurring in certain 
instances, overall, it does not drive public pension funds to bring securities 
class actions.  Moreover, my data suggest that business interests may influence 
elected officials to discourage lead plaintiff appointments, even where their 
funds would be well-positioned to obtain them. 
To reiterate, I define pay-not-to-play not as the opposite of “pay-to-play,” 
but as something broader.  It is unlikely that anyone would contribute to a 
politician with the specific hope that the politician would restrain her public 
pension fund from pursuing a lead plaintiff appointment against the contributor 
or the contributor’s allies, since some other party will likely bring the lawsuit 
anyway.  pay-not-to-play simply suggests that politicians who are either 
themselves pro-business, who receive campaign contributions from business 
interests, or who are subject to other forms of pressure from business interests, 
are likely to avoid lead plaintiff appointments.   
To empirically test if pay-not-to-play may be impacting the funds’ pursuit of 
lead plaintiff appointments, I relied on a few metrics, including an annual 
survey of U.S. state liability systems conducted by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Institute for Legal Reform (Chamber Survey), 128 and an annual 
128 HUMPHREY TAYLOR, DAVID KRANE & DIANA L. GRAVITCH, 2004 U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY: FINAL REPORT.  For state public 
pension funds, I used the rankings at Table 3 (“Overall Ranking of State Liability Systems”) 
of the Chamber Survey.  Id. at 15.  For the five city public pension funds in the Largest 
Funds sample, I used Table 5 (“Local Jurisdictions with the Least Fair and Reasonable 
Litigation Environment”).  Id. at 18.  All four jurisdictions for the five city pension funds in 
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survey of “The Best States for Business” by Forbes Magazine (Forbes 
Survey).  The Chamber Survey focuses on how senior attorneys at companies 
with annual revenues of at least $100 million view the litigation environment 
in each of the fifty states.129  The Forbes Survey ranks states’ business-
friendliness by several metrics, including business costs, the labor pool, 
regulatory environment, economic climate, growth prospects, and quality of 
life.130  I utilize the Chamber Survey and the Forbes Survey as rough measures 
of how much influence big business has with state politicians, and, by 
extension, how much impact it has on the public pension funds within each 
state.  I hypothesize that a state’s ranking in the Chamber Survey and the 
Forbes Survey will negatively correlate with lead plaintiff appointments 
obtained by public pension funds in the state.  Table 10 contains regression 
results for Chamber Rank and Forbes Rank.131
the Largest Funds sample appeared in Table 5.  Id.
129 Id.
130 See The Best States for Business, FORBES, July 11, 2007, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2007/07/10/washington-virginia-utah-biz-cz_kb_0711bizstates-
table.html.  The Forbes Survey began in 2006. 
131 The state-by-state election data for the 2004 election was obtained from America 
Votes 2004, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004 (click on menu “Pick state” and 
select state) (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).   
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As predicted, both variables are negative and statistically significant.  The 
Chamber Rank variable loses its significance when included alongside 
variables of board control regressed in Table 3, but the Forbes Rank variable 
remains negative and statistically significant in all models.  Note that in 
Models 6 and 7, the variables for beneficiary board members remain positive 
and statistically significant at the five percent confidence level.  In contrast, the 
political control variable which was negative and marginally statistically 
significant in Table 3 loses its significance when regressed with the Forbes 
Rank variable here.  This suggests that at least some of the resistance to lead 
plaintiff appointments by politicians is a product of their sensitivity to business 
interests.  Once those business interests are accounted for, political resistance 
to lead plaintiff appointments flags.  In contrast, business influence has 
effectively no impact on the correlation between beneficiary board members 
and lead plaintiff appointments.  This evidence supports the proposition that 
public pension funds in business-friendly states tend to avoid lead plaintiff 
appointments or seek comparatively few such appointments.  The Chamber 
and Forbes Survey results provide some support for the pay-not-to-play theory, 
demonstrating that politicians are sensitive to their constituencies and the 
special interests that act upon them, and, further, that where those constituents 
and special interests tend to lean in favor of business interests, lead plaintiff 
appointments do not follow.  Campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
assuming they exist in such jurisdictions, may simply not be enough to tip the 
balance towards lead plaintiff appointments among politicians in states that are 
particularly sensitive to big business concerns.  In addition, plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
well aware of the pro-business orientation of the politician or of his state, 
might even avoid “wasting” campaign contributions there.  Conversely, those 
states big business considers hostile have public pension funds that obtain 
more lead plaintiff appointments.   
Several recent examples of business interests influencing public pension 
fund policies and decision-making provide indirect illustrations of how pay-
not-to-play could operate in practice.  For example, in late 2004, CalPERS 
President Sean Harrigan was ousted from the CalPERS Board, a coup 
attributed to the influence of the California Chamber of Commerce and the 
California Business Roundtable.132  As noted earlier, Harrigan, an outspoken 
advocate for shareholder rights and corporate governance reforms, had led 
calls for the ouster of Disney Chief Executive Michael Eisner (who 
subsequently resigned in 2006) and attempted to force the resignation of 
132 Marc Lifsher, State Pension Chief Expects to Be Axed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at 
A1 (mentioning accusations of improper conduct leveled at Harrigan by the California 
Chamber of Commerce and the California Business Roundtable, and Harrigan’s own 
attribution of his ouster to these entities, other business interests, and the administration of 
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger).  But see Tom Petruno, Business Applauds 
Shake-Up at CalPERS, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A1 (stating that the California 
Republican Party and “business groups” denied lobbying for Harrigan’s ouster). 
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Safeway CEO Steven Burd.133  A regional executive for the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union,134 Harrigan had been viewed as a powerful 
advocate for corporate governance reform,135 although some members of the 
corporate governance movement also criticized him for his aggressive 
tactics.136  The State Personnel Board, a five-member board overseeing the 
state’s civil service system, refused Harrigan’s reappointment to the CalPERS 
Board.137  Three of the State Personnel Board’s members – two Republicans 
appointed by California Governors Arnold Schwarzenegger and Pete Wilson, 
and one Democrat – chose to support another candidate.138  Harrigan’s removal 
was particularly controversial in light of the fact that in the year 2003, under 
his leadership, CalPERS earned a 23.3% return on investment.139
Likewise, in response to pressure from the American Enterprise Institute, 
among others, Republican Governor Rick Perry of Texas ordered the state’s 
public pension funds to divest from companies doing business with Iran, 
requiring the liquidation of positions the funds held in international energy 
conglomerates such as France’s Total and Great Britain’s Royal Dutch 
Shell.140  The Texas funds’ divestment was a reaction to a broader campaign 
by AEI and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to highlight public pension funds’ 
purported indirect financing of terrorism.141  And while this particular episode 
133 Lifsher, supra note 132 (“[Harrigan] said corporate and political interests – including 
Walt Disney Co. and supermarket giant Safeway Inc. – were ‘trying to take out one of the 
most outspoken advocates on behalf of corporate governance in the country.’”). 
134 Id.
135 Petruno, supra note 132, at A1. 
136 Sundeep Tucker, ‘Ideological Puritan’ Who Alienated by Belligerence, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2004, at 27 (describing Harrigan’s public tirade against the International Corporate 
Governance Network Chairman over the Chairman’s decision to appoint a corporate 
member to the Network’s Board and noting that corporate governance community may have 
welcomed his departure as much as the business community did). 
137 Lifsher, supra note 132. 
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Lucius Lomax, Texas v. Iran: About the Order Banning Public Pension Fund 
Investments, NEWSPAPER TREE, (Aug. 22, 2008) http://newspapertree.com/opinion/2770 
(estimating that the Texas Teachers Retirement System and Employees Retirement System 
have in excess of $1 billion invested in affected companies); see also Texas: Governor 
Seeks Divestment from Companies in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 19, 2007, at A21  (mentioning 
Governor Rick Perry’s exploration of whether he has the authority to order state public 
pension funds to divest from companies doing business with Iran, and observing that he had 
already ordered divestment from companies doing business in Sudan because of the 
atrocities in Darfur); Texas Governor Seeks Divestment from Companies Dealing with Iran,
HAARETZ, Jul. 19, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/883892.html. 
141 Jim Wasserman, Corporate American Pushes Back: After Years of Concentrated 
Attacks by Public Pension Funds and Politicians, Companies and Allies Say ‘Enough’,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 3, 2005, available at http://www.commondreams.org /headlines05/ 
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of business interests exercising influence over public pension funds postdates 
the timeframe of my lead plaintiff sample, I note that of the four Texas public 
pension funds that appear on my Largest Funds list –  the Teachers’ Retirement 
System of Texas ($77.8 billion in assets), the Employees’ Retirement System 
of Texas ($18.8 billion in assets), the Texas County and District Retirement 
System ($10.0 billion in assets), and the Texas Municipal Retirement System 
($10.3 billion in assets) – none obtained a lead plaintiff appointment between 
2003 and 2006.  More recently, Democratic Governor Steve Beshear of 
Kentucky invited the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce to participate in 
reforming the investment practices of the state’s two major public pension 
funds, the Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System and the Kentucky 
Retirement Systems, including adding majorities of investment experts to the 
investment committees and reforming the allocation of assets in the investment 
portfolio.142  The press release announcing the reforms prominently noted the 
participation of the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, and further quoted its 
president and CEO, who stated, “[w]e support the changes embodied in this 
proposal and applaud the governor’s leadership on this issue.”143  The 
Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System and the Kentucky Retirement Systems 
are both Largest Funds with $12.1 billion and $12.4 billion in assets, 
respectively.  As with the Texas funds, the Kentucky funds obtained no lead 
plaintiff appointments from 2003-2006.   
Setting aside the merits of this intervention by business interests in both the 
leadership and the investment decisions of public pension funds, the examples 
above illustrate the susceptibility of public pension funds to influence by 
business interests.  Politicians who serve on public pension fund boards are just 
as exposed to political pressure – including campaign contributions – from 
business interests as they are from plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Strong opposition to 
securities class actions by business interests may reduce public pension fund 
participation in securities class actions, particularly by politically dominated 
funds, and particularly in states highly sensitive to such interests, or insensitive 
to countervailing interests.144  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, consistently 
0103-23.htm.; see also US Pension Funds Indirectly Support Terror: Report, REUTERS,
Aug. 14, 2004, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/news/us-pension-funds-
indirectly-support-terror-report/112380/0. 
142 Press Release, Governor Steve Beshear, Gov. Beshear Calls on Pension Systems to 
Reform Investment Practices (Nov. 20, 2008), http://governor.ky.gov/pressrelease. 
htm?PostingGUID=%7BB18C3139-6834-48C4-9D70-E0073289D862%7D. 
143 Id.
144 It may be argued that pay-to-play explains why the Largest Funds list and the 
Litigating Funds List are not more similar, or even identical, to one another.  Most of the 
Largest Funds are statewide funds or funds from major cities.  In contrast, most of the 
Litigating Funds are local municipal funds from small to midsized cities or counties.  
Campaign contributions to politicians serving on such fund boards are more difficult to 
track than contributions to politicians serving on statewide or large urban fund boards.  
Therefore, according to this reasoning, campaign contributions to these smaller funds will 
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one of the nation’s largest campaign contributors, may take some comfort from 
this data that its contributions and lobbying efforts are having some effect in 
preventing public pension funds from leading shareholder lawsuits against the 
Chamber’s members.   
CONCLUSION
The data presented here demonstrate that politicians and political control 
negatively correlate with lead plaintiff appointments in securities class actions.  
This fact challenges the belief that the primary driver of public pension fund 
activism in securities class actions is “pay-to-play,” the theory that the funds 
participate in these actions because politicians who serve on the funds’ boards 
of trustees seek lead plaintiff appointments in exchange for campaign 
contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Pay-to-play may be taking place in 
certain instances, and plaintiffs’ lawyers undoubtedly contribute substantial 
sums of money to politicians with control over public pension funds (and to 
politicians with no control over the funds).  But if pay-to-play were driving 
pension fund participation overall, politicians and political control would 
correlate positively, and not negatively, with lead plaintiff appointments.  The 
data also provide some support for “pay-not-to-play;” to the extent that public 
pension funds are susceptible to political pressure, through campaign 
contributions and otherwise, that pressure tends to decrease the funds’ 
participation in securities litigation, not increase it.  Business interests appear 
to be successful in using political pressure to reduce lead plaintiff 
appointments.  This may explain why the very largest public pension funds 
participate in securities class actions less frequently than one would predict. 
Conversely, beneficiaries on public pension fund boards strongly and 
positively correlate with lead plaintiff appointments.  Such funds may be 
pursuing lead plaintiff appointments because the beneficiary board members 
personally incur losses in securities frauds, and thereby are more highly 
motivated to take the lead in a class action to remedy the loss.  This Article 
flow unnoticed; lawyers would rather make such contributions and politicians would rather 
receive them, since there is little chance for the public to discover such contributions, unlike 
politicians on Largest Funds boards.  The counterargument to this is that local politicians at 
the small city or county level are hardly in need of campaign contributions, as they are not 
making significant purchases of advertising, for example.  Such elections are much more 
likely decided by local manpower and local political machines than they are by elaborate 
political campaigns funded by significant campaign contributions.  Moreover, a recent study 
suggests that large local public pension funds correlate with lower attorneys’ fees for the 
class, which cuts against the suggestion that there is more pay-to-play at the local level.  The
Price of Pay to Play, supra note 10, at 22-24.  But even if one were to accept the argument 
that the difference between the Largest Funds and the Litigating Funds is explained by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ preference to make (and politicians preference to receive) campaign 
contributions that will likely go unnoticed, this still does not explain why beneficiaries 
positively correlate with – and politicians negatively correlate with – lead plaintiff 
appointments for both the Largest Funds and the Litigating Funds samples. 
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furnishes some empirical support for this theory, showing that underfunded 
public pension funds are more likely to obtain lead plaintiff appointments, 
particularly when they are controlled by beneficiaries.  Beneficiary board 
members may also pursue these cases because they are accountable to the 
narrow constituency of their peer beneficiaries who elect them, unlike 
politicians who serve a broader constituency.  Moreover, as beneficiary board 
members are relatively immune to political pressures, business interests may 
be less successful, or may not even attempt, to reduce securities litigation 
activity among beneficiary-dominated funds. 
While these facts do not rule out the possibility that pay-to-play is taking 
place in certain instances, they suggest that pay-to-play does not drive public 
pension activism in securities litigation.  Overall, beneficiary board members – 
not politicians – drive these cases for reasons having to do with the financial 
soundness of the fund.  These conclusions have potentially significant public 
policy implications.  First, when considered with prior research demonstrating 
the efficacy of public pension funds as lead plaintiffs, and the skill of 
beneficiary board members as fund fiduciaries, this evidence supports the 
contention that the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision is working as intended, 
and that, from the point of view of shareholders, public pension funds are 
desirable lead plaintiffs.  Other jurisdictions that have begun to follow the 
PSLRA structure of lead plaintiff selection, such as Delaware, may take 
comfort that they have taken the correct approach.  Moreover, courts faced 
with pay-to-play allegations may wish to use these findings to evaluate the 
board structure of the pension fund in question.  If a politician on the board of 
trustees, or with appointing power to it, received a campaign contribution from 
a plaintiffs’ law firm, but the board overall is actually controlled by 
beneficiaries or at least has substantial beneficiary representation, the court 
should be less concerned that the fund has been unduly drafted into a securities 
class action that is not in the interests of its beneficiaries, or shareholders 
overall.  Finally, the fact that pay-to-play is not driving the bulk of public 
pension fund participation in securities class actions suggests that the 
numerous proposed legislative and administrative solutions to “pay-to-play,” 
even if enacted, will be unlikely to have much impact on the rate of public 
pension fund participation in securities class actions.   
